

Abstract

- 01 China Is Confronted with More Complicated Peripheral and International Situation, by Chen Xulong & Su Xiaohui, Director and Deputy Director of Institute of International Strategic Studies, China Institutes of International Studies. In recent years, structural contradictions in international relations have intensified sharply, which is giving rise to new crises and new challenges. The world becomes even more unstable. China is embroiled in territorial disputes with neighboring countries while the U.S. quickens its steps in implementing “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy, and the building of new model of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. faces with new challenges. The Ukraine crisis has made Europe once again the frontier of big power rivalries. The rise of extreme terrorist elements in Western Asia and Northern Africa has influenced the regional setup greatly. The momentum of revitalization of the West is strengthening while the rise of the developing countries has shown signs of slowdown. The double-growth pattern in global economy is emerging more clearly. The tide of seeking development through changes is getting stronger. To China, the peripheral and international situation still brings it with an increasing number of uncertainties which presents new challenges for China to maintain the strategic opportunity period required for its peaceful development.

- 11 Jointly Build a New Strategic Innovative Thinking of Asian Peaceful Development Environment in the New Century, by Xu Tao, Former Director and Research Fellow of Institute for Russian and Central Asian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Asia is now a region in the world where manifold cultures and complicated contradictions and clashes are contained. Rapid economic development doesn't really provide it with stability. Instead its geo-political plates are undergoing a radical transformation. Various countries in the region all keep a watchful eye on each other. Against such a background, the Chinese leaders bring forward the new Asian security concept, which has pushed the exploration of building Asian security environment to a new stage. In the course of defusing security crisis in the region, the new Asian security concepts advocated by the Chinese leaders will surely undergo the test of knowledge and continually be enriched in the practice.
- 22 The Cross-border Sub-Regional Cooperation and the Silk Road Economic Belt: a Perspective from Geo-economics, by Dr. Xiao Yang, Associate Professor and Research Fellow from the Center for International Studies, Beijing International Studies University. China has proposed the concept of the "Silk Road Economic Belt", which is a strategic initiative with global vision and conducive to the construction of a new platform for the cooperation between China and Eurasian countries. As the Silk Road Economic Belt covers a large area with a lot natural barriers, it is suggested that efforts be started from the promotion of cross-border sub-regional trade cooperation and attention be given to the medium and small area development to push forward the overall regional development. From this perspective, the Silk Road Economic Belt is a typical cross-border sub-regional cooperation. The "sub-regional cooperation theory" is the

theoretical strut for China to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt with Central and Southern Asian countries. This paper explores the route for the transnational cooperation of the Silk Road Economic Belt from the experience of the contemporary new economic zone development, focused on fostering the development of cross-border sub-regional economic zones and confidence-building among countries concerned, and the effects of assistance of international cooperation.

- 33 The Principle of International Relations that is Worth of Inheriting and Innovating Forever ---- Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Birth of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by Zhou Shixin, Director of Big Power Diplomacy Division of the Institute of Foreign Policies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Although the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has traversed 60 years in history, it still has great attraction and vitality. Born in the 1950s and against special backdrop, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence attaches great and special importance to the principle of non-interference into each other's internal affairs, which is compliant to managing the relations between nations with similar or different political systems, and has universal significance. China's diplomacy should, on the basis of adhering to the spirits of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, promote new type of international relations that keep pace with the time, maintain and promote international peace and security, promote the growth of mutual beneficial and win-win development communities, and deal cautiously the issue of functional transfer of sovereignty. China also ought to continuously enrich and develop the connotation and the extension of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, resolve the restraints of its practical appliance, and strengthen its universality of normalizing international relations.

- 44 Japan's Geopolitical Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era, by Dr. Ge Hanwen, Associate Professor, Center for International Strategic Studies, PLA University of International Relations in Nanjing. The reflection on the Japanese pre-war geopolitics and the rise of the “Maritime State Theory” in Japan are the two major components of Japan's geopolitical thinking in the post-Cold War era, which concluded in the end that Japan should ally with the US as well as other “maritime states” and strengthen containment of and keep watch on the “continental powers” including China. Japan's geopolitical studies in the post-Cold War era have hardly transcended on the whole the classical geopolitical category, whose main theoretical style includes blind faith on power confrontation and spacial contention, and exaggeration of ideological conflicts. Japan's geopolitical thinking in the post-Cold War era has a great impact on the formulation and practice of its external strategies.
- 61 The DPRK-ROK Relationship and the Six-Party Talks, by Shi Yongming, Associate Research Fellow, China Institutes of International Studies. The Korean Peninsula is in a deep deadlock of antagonism and the US is pursuing a policy of containment for change inside the DPRK. The “confidence-building process of the Korean Peninsula” initiated by ROK has been frustrated as the two sides can hardly find a common ground for dialog. The relationship between the DPRK and ROK is once again in a state of stalemate and a state without any treaty signed, and any dialog or negotiation going on between them. The continuation of such an antagonism has made it impossible to resume the Six-party Talks, let alone the resolution of the nuclear issue. To break the deadlock, ROK needs to make a clear understanding of the structural limitations it is in, bring the bilateral relations back to the reconciliation track defined by the treaties it signed with

the DPRK in the past, and make every effort to restart the Six-party Talks.

- 75 **The Military Modernization Program of the Philippines and the South China Sea Issue,** by Yang Yang, Lecturer of the Department of Asian and African Languages, PLA University of Foreign Languages. Weak military power and the South China Sea issue have hastened the military modernization development program of the Philippines. The South China Sea issue has not only provided a pretext for the Philippines to engage in military reforms and increase its military budget, but also the reasonable excuse for the U.S. to provide military aid to the Philippines. As the Philippines are using the complexity and the long lasting of the South China Sea issue to realize its strategic goal of developing its military power, its promotion of expanding the South China Sea issue will continue for a long time in the future.
- 87 **The Profound Impact of Ukraine Crisis on International Geopolitics,** by Qian Wenrong, Senior Research Fellow from the Center for World Studies, Xinhua News Agency and China Foundation for International Studies. Although the Ukrainian national election is over and the new president is elected, its crisis is far from over, which has exerted profound impact on global geopolitics and international relations. The major impacts include: Ukraine is basically incorporated into the Western system, Russia's relationship with the West has been deteriorating, the Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination will enter a phase of all-round development, Europe will reclaim serious considerations of the U.S., and the international energy pattern will undergo profound changes. Though the Ukraine crisis has pinned down the "Asia-Pacific Re-balancing Strategy"

pursued by the Obama administration, but the U.S. will not abandon such a strategy.

94 **The Situation in Europe in the Face of the Ukraine Crisis,** by Ding Yuanhong, Former Chinese Ambassador to the EU. The EU has plotted the “Color Revolution” in Ukraine, but it cannot control the development there, which has showed deficiency of the EU: its depressed economy cannot meet the demand of Ukraine for financial assistance; its influence on Ukraine is so declined that it cannot pursue a diplomatic and security policy through referendum; its employment situation is so bad and living standard so down that ultra right forces in Europe have reared their ugly heads and the confidence of the people in EU has further declined.

100 **Conflict of Values in the Contemporary World and the Prospect of Euro-Asian Integration,** by A.B. Lukin, Deputy Dean of College of Foreign Affairs, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By making a comparison between the former Soviet Union, today’s Russia and the West on the process of birth and development of respected civilizations, the Russian scholar expounded the “conflict of values” between the East and the West in contemporary world and by so doing, he makes a forecast about the future Euro-Asian integration prospect. He believes that the main borderline will still be the concept of values even in the future world. On one side, there are proponents of absolute concept of values while on the other side there stand relativists of morals and concept of values. At present, the Western powers are still alive, but they are losing their leading position in the field of morality.

Japan's Geopolitical Thinking in the Post Cold War Era

By Ge Hanwen

Geopolitical studies have had a long ideological tradition in Japan, which is almost synchronous with the rise of modern Western geopolitical studies. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, there appeared a number of translations in Japan that introduced the ideas of Friedrich Ratzel, Alfred T. Mahan, Halford J. Mackinder, to name just a few. Since 1930s, Geopolitik, with Karl Haushofer as the main representative, has aroused great interest of Japanese political and military circles as well as academia. As Japan was speeding the pace to become a militaristic state, some Japanese scholars, such as Komaki Saneshige, Limoto Hiroyuk and Ueda Ryotake, tried to create a brand-new Japanese geopolitics, by meticulously studying Geopolitik and fitting Japanese cultural and political traditions as well as Japan's ambition of aggression and expansion into geopolitical theory models. And this new geopolitics laid a theoretical foundation for Japan's national decisions and its major external strategies in the 1930s and 1940s, and demised in the end with Japan's dream of "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".

Since 1970s, the publication of Introduction to Nuclear Geopolitics by Haruna Matsuo, Marine Geopolitics by Tada Akishu, Introduction

to Geopolitics by Kawano Shujika, and quite a number of other such kind of works, have started in Japan the prelude of geopolitical studies for its renaissance in the post - Second World War era. Especially, since the end of the Cold War, responding to the drastic changes of the world political and economic situation and the international environment Japan is in, contemporary Japanese political and intellectual elites have been engaged in heated discussions on the international situation in the 21st century, Japan's international role as a state, and its external strategies. In this grand discussion, geopolitics has once again become quite popular in Japanese political circle and academia, as marked by the re-publication in Japanese of *Pacific Geopolitics* by Haushofer in 2005 and *Democratic Ideal and Reality* by Mackinder in 2008. The reemergence of geopolitical studies in the post - Cold War Japan has profoundly manifested the dramatic changes of collective mentality in contemporary Japan, some of which has been shown in Japan's external strategies, and deserve our close attention.

I. Review and Reflection on Japan's Pre-war Geopolitics

The major agenda and academic contribution of Japan's geopolitical studies in the post - Cold War era concentrated on review and criticism of Japan's pre-war geopolitics. As early as in the Cold War period, there appeared an ideological trend of reflections on Japan's idea and practice of expansion in recent history. During this period, some scholars, who had started geopolitical studies before the Second World War, such as Limoto Hiroyuk, Murakami Jio and Ishii Susuke, successively published articles meticulously analyzing and reviewing the origin, logic and major ideas of Japan's pre-war geopolitics and their relations with the rise of militarism. In 1972, the Technical Survey Committee on Air and Sea of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party published a report the Defense of Japan as a

Maritime State, which clearly requested “getting to the bottom of” Japan’s geopolitics. The report pointed out that whether Imperial Way Geopolitics represented by Komaki Saneshige, or the Japanese Geopolitical Association, of which Limoto Hiroyuk was an important member, were all greatly influenced by Geopolitik represented by Haushofer. It was under the strong advocacy of the Japanese geopolitics that Japan’s military department put forward the scheme of the so-call “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” and aligned with the continental state Germany, pitching the maritime state Japan directly against such maritime states as the UK and the US. And this is the major cause that Japan lost the Second World War.

Since the beginning of the new century, some young Japanese scholars, drawing on the new ideas and spirits of contemporary Western geopolitical studies, have often reflected innovatively on Japan’s pre-war geopolitics. They point out that geopolitics itself has many insurmountable logical defects, the most prominent of which are “randomness” and “power”. Although geography itself has indisputable scientific nature, it becomes “the servant of political stance and the tool to justify the needs of power” when it is applied to politics. Based on this logic, these scholars believe that the fundamental reason for Japan’s pre-war geopolitics went astray lies in the fact that its academic premise was to correct the reality that “the world order and power distribution had been distorted by the West” and provide a theoretical basis for creating “a Japanese type of world order” in the form of “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. Under the guidance of this idea, the so-called Imperial Way Geopolitics wished to establish an anti-West world outlook through geographical studies and by using such abstract idea of Imperial Way to cover its theoretical deficiencies. While the Japanese Geopolitical Association wished to study Japan’s continental and maritime spheres of influence by applying the methodology of geopolitics and establish “a well defended nation”. It was under the reign of

“power” that Japan’s pre-war geopolitical scholars, encouraged by the rise of expansionism within Japan and supported by Japanese military, “randomly” molded their geographical knowledge into a strategic guidance for Japan’s external expansion, which had lost “sober and objective” judgment of the world situation. As a result, “this led to Japan’s complete defeat in the Second World War”.

On the other hand, these contemporary Japanese scholars, to some extent, are “sympathetic to” Japan’s pre-war geopolitics. In their minds, although there were various kinds of problems in regard to Japan’s pre-war geopolitical studies, its greatest “contribution” was that it showed “the courage” to go against the pre-war world order dominated by the Western imperialists, namely “the Asia-Pacific order vs the West-Centric order”. This strategic transformation showed that Japanese elites had abandoned the mindset of “datsu-A” and begun to pursue Japan’s “special way”, which could be seen as the first signs of the idea of “diversified world outlook” and “Asian integration”.

II. Return to “the Maritime State Theory”

While partly reflecting on and criticizing Japan’s pre-war geopolitics, many contemporary Japanese scholars have shown great favor of another branch of Japan’s pre-war geopolitical inclination, “the Maritime State Theory”. As early as 1920s and 1930s, when Japan’s ambition of continental expansion was greatly inflated, former Vice Admiral Misaki Sato Tetsutaro, the chief founder of Japan’s pre-war Sea Power Theory, pointed out that as a maritime power, Japan should give up the intention of continental expansion and turn to natural and advantageous geographical endowments, capitalizing on the might of sea power to seek the growth of power. Although the advocacy of Sato and others disappeared under the joint attack of the Army and continental expansionists, Sato’s pre-war

idea of refraining from continental expansion and strengthening sea power was highly appreciated by Japan's post war scholars, as Japan's ambition of expansion and aggression was brought to an end in the Second World War.

Since the end of the Cold War, the argument of developing sea power raised by Misaki Soto Tetsutaro, Akiyama Mayuki and some others more than half a century ago has been the key part for Japan's contemporary academia to rediscover the geopolitical studies of the pre-war time. As a result, "the Maritime State Theory" has become quite popular within Japan's intelligentsia. In 1978, the former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, when summarizing "the lessons" in Japan's recent history, pointed out that "from the perspective of geopolitics, Japan is a maritime state." If Japan forgets or abandons its status as a maritime state, it basically ends up in failure. Historically speaking, it is true whether it was in the Bai Cun Jiang War (663AD) in the Tang Dynasty, the Korean Battle (1592-1598) during Wanli's reign in the Ming Dynasty, or wars with China in recent history. While in the Second World War, Japan's ambition to occupy the continent and its alliance with the continental power Germany brought it to a deadly end. Therefore, Japan should keep this historical lesson deep in mind and stick firmly to the road of maritime state.

In the course of the rise of "the Maritime State Theory" in post Cold War Japan, one of the most prominent advocates is the Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc., which from April of 1998 to January of 2002 published a series of reports including Japan's Identity: A State Neither Western, Nor Oriental; Japan's Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: From an Island Nation to a Sea Power, and Japan's Conception as a Maritime Power in the 21st Century: World Order and Regional Order. These reports elaborate the visions of Japan's contemporary political and intellectual elites in regard to Japan's position in geopolitics of the world, which have a profound

impact on Japanese society. In the eyes of these scholars and politicians, as an island nation surrounded by Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, East China Sea and the Pacific, Japan is at periphery of Eurasia heartland, the pivot of maritime powers, as well as connecting points for states at periphery. This unique geopolitical attribution has determined the fundamental attribution of Japan's external strategy and its future possible orientation, namely playing the role as a sea power in geopolitics. Japan should take advantage of the surrounding seas and ocean as a natural barrier for defense and security, while plays a global role by capitalizing on the well extended sea routes for maritime communication and trade.

On the basis of recognizing Japan's geopolitical attribution, these Japanese political and intellectual elites believe that Japan's external strategy for survival, development or even success depend heavily on enhancing alliance with other maritime powers and safeguarding the so-called "the world order based on the values of the sea". In fact, the US-Japan security alliance is "the cooperation between a global sea power and a regional sea power". Some Japanese scholars, after summarizing Japan's recent history, have "found out" that Japan flourished whenever it got into alliance with other maritime powers and kept on guard against the expansion of continental powers, while it failed whenever it allied with continental powers or pursued a continental expansion strategy. In 1904, Japan, when in alliance with the UK (a sea power) and supported by the US (another sea power), defeated the continental power Russia; in the First World War, Japan in alliance with the UK and the US defeated the continental power Germany; whereas Japan got defeated in the Second World War when it allied with Germany and fought with the UK and the US. The revival of Japan in the wake of the Second World War could be attributed to its alliance with the US (a sea power), which was an important assurance for its security and prosperity during the Cold War. It is through looking at the history from both positive and

negative sides that these Japanese scholars came to the conclusion that Japan can never again pursue the strategy of continental expansion and enter alliance with continental powers. Historical lessons should be kept in mind: stay away from continental powers and keep to sea power status. Based on these findings, these Japanese scholars put forward the imperatives for Japan's external strategy: while continuing to ally with the US, Japan should actively promote the establishment of an alliance of maritime states including the US, Australia, New Zealand, India, and ASEAN.

These Japanese scholars point out with great resentment that since the end of World War II, most of the Japanese have been inclined to “forgetting about” Japan's “imperialist past” and believing that Japan in geopolitics is only a small island nation made up of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and some tiny islands, while the decision makers of Japan's external strategy have never put Japan's maritime security and maritime interest at the core of Japan's external strategy, instead they have declared successively to give up the right of war, not to keep armed forces, depend heavily on the US for security matters, unaware of “the threats and challenges” Japan is currently confronted for its national security and future development, under the constraint of the Pacifist Clause (Article 9 of the Constitution). Currently, as one of the most popular geopolitical theories, “the Maritime State Theory” has a strong impact on Japan's strategic transition in the post Cold War era.

III. Contain and Keep Watch on “Continental States”

While “the Maritime State Theory” strongly advocates sticking to the attribution of a sea power and allying strategically with other maritime powers, it also focuses on the issue of how to cope with the so-called “continental states”. What is worth noting is that with the end of the Cold War and China's peaceful development, currently in

the mainstream viewpoints within Japanese political and intellectual circles, China has replaced the former Soviet Union as the representative of “the continental states” beyond “Maritime Asia” that Japan needs to keep on the closest guard against. Under the vicious description of quite some Japanese scholars and politicians, China is painted as a “continental state” that goes against maritime states and maritime civilization, and has a totally different geo attributions and pattern of behaviors, whose “continuous expansion” in recent years into the maritime space around continental Asia has become the chief barrier for Japan to safeguard its security and prosperity, and maintain peace and stability in East Asia. Based on this mental tendency, “the Maritime State Theory” is manifested on three essentials in Japan’s external strategy, two of which seek as policy objectives to contain and keep alert on the expansion of the so-called “continental states” including China.

This mental tendency in Japanese mainstream society to exclude and suspect the continental states including China in East Asia has deep roots. With the development of recent history, though the geopolitical imagination of China in Japanese political and intellectual circles has changed “from exclusion to hostility and to defiance”, on the whole, the mentality to exclude and guard against China has long been hidden in the minds of Japanese decision makers and mainstream society as a mainline. Even after Japan’s ambition of continental expansion was shattered, the mentality to exclude and suspect China within Japanese mainstream society has never been reduced. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Sino-Japanese friendly relations developed smoothly, Nakasone Yasuhiro, one of the chief Japanese advocates for the normalization of relations with China, once denounced the viewpoints of some Japanese that showed favor of mainland China and Southeast Asia, and believed that these viewpoints were remnants of the old time fever of “continentalism” and the “homesick” for Asia type emotion of greater Asia. This

emotion has failed to understand Japan's history and dispassionately calculated the gains and losses of Japan's national interests.

In their planning, as the US is a sea power and has absolute military advantages, Japan should seek to maintain special relations with the US and the UK, and the Trans-Pacific Japan-US military alliance, while trying to ensure that other states or regions of strategic importance along key international maritime trade routes, with undisputable sea power attributions and liberal governments remain friendly with Japan and join Japan in keeping guards against the rise of continental states. In their view, such Western Pacific nations as Australia and New Zealand, Taiwan and the Philippines along Bashi Channel, and Malaysia and Singapore that guard the Malacca, are potential partners Japan should win over to form an encirclement around China. On this basis, some Japanese scholars have also mentioned that Japan should make flexible use of the balance of power principle and the tactics of "associating with the distant nations while attacking the near ones", skillfully using all kinds of stakes to sow discord between China and Russia and push them into strategic confrontation so as to prevent China and Russia from forming an intimate alliance, as a China-Russian alliance is a nightmare for Japan. Meanwhile, Japan should join the US in keeping China and Russia from having military harbors, air bases and missile bases in this buffer zone, so as to stop the expansion of continental states towards seas and oceans.

Some Japanese political and intellectual elites have planned offensives on China in accordance with "the Maritime State Theory" that they deeply believe in, which has a strong influence on Japan's external strategy. Today, Japan's intention to construct encirclement around China and keep China from developing friendly relations and engaging in cooperation with neighboring countries has become more and more obvious. As early as in the first Abe administration, Japan raised the so-called "arch of freedom and prosperity" strategy,

trying to form encirclement on the basis of ideology around China with countries at the periphery of Eurasia from the Korean Peninsula, down to India, and further to Central Asia and West Asia. In January of 2013, Abe put forward the so-called new “Five Diplomatic Principles”, which in reality was the refurbished version of the “arch of freedom and prosperity” strategy, and further emphasized on the orientation of maritime state, the US-Japan alliance and winning over the nations around the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean to deal with China.

VI. Features, Results and Assessment of Japan’s Geopolitics in the Post-Cold War Era

American specialist of Japan Richard J. Samuels pointed out that since Meiji Reform in 1868, Japan’s external strategy has had clear continuation: Japan first became No. 1 power in the Far East through allying with the UK in 1902; in 1940, Japan tried hard to realize its dream to dominate the Far East by signing the Axis Pact of Three with Germany and Italy; in the post-Second World War era, Japan successfully realized economic takeoff by signing the Japan-US Security Treaty with the Americans. All the alliance behaviors of Japan have manifested a grant practical strategy, namely assuring its existence and prosperity through allying with the most powerful powers of the time.

In the 50 years from its defeat in the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, as a matter of fact, the principle of alliance represented by Yoshida Doctrine has dominated Japan’s external strategy, namely pursuing a low cost security policy of demilitarization and defensiveness on the basis of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Yoshida Doctrine has a clear and practical definition of Japan’s national identity, whose goals were very distinct: taking advantage of the US-Soviet antithesis to assure Japan’s independence

and security against the backdrop of the global confrontation of the two superpowers in the Cold War, and reducing as much as possible the burden of military expenses and putting limited capital to economic revival by joining in the US camp for security. In this way, Japan has assured both security and prosperity. With drastic changes in international relations since 1970s, Japan's economic rise and the relatively weakening of the American power have posed serious challenges to Japan's post-Second World War national development strategy of allying with the US and keeping economic development at the core. Under such circumstances, Japan's long suppressed nationalist sentiment began to waken, and the idea that Japan should play a bigger and more positive role in international strategic affairs has taken the wind under repeated preaching of Japan's politicians including Nakasone Yasuhiro. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War further boosted the development of such a tendency.

Corresponding to such a tendency, Japan's external strategy and security policies began to change, giving up the practice of depending totally on the US for security regardless of the regional and international security situation in the Cold War. Currently, Japan has taken a new and much broader view of national security and defense, and tried intentionally to play a bigger role in global strategic affairs in the post-Cold War era to show its "big power status". As a result, Japan has changed from "a pacifist state" to the so-called "international state", which has not only been accepted by Japan's political and intellectual elite, but also reached certain consensus in Japan's internal security discourse.

The rise of Japan's geopolitical studies in the post-Cold War era has resulted from the collective change of mentality within Japanese society. At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Japanese society got confused in regard to the Japan's future national development, and an uncertainty known as "geopolitical daze" has spread to all

areas including political practice, mass media and even pop culture, seriously affecting Japanese society's basic judgment on "we and they" and "allies and foes". As a result of responding to the domestic and international political changes in the pos-Cold War era, geopolitics has begun to be used by many Japanese political elites as a ready tool to describe Japan and the world, avert uncertainties, and reconstruct Japan's national and social identity. Some scholars have argued that the revival of geopolitical studies in Japan and the popularity of "the Maritime State Theory" have showed the passive summarization of Japan's history of aggression in the mentality of "the winner has all and the loser loses all", psychological dependence on and theological adherence to the master-servant US-Japan security framework, the reasonless fear and hatred of China's fast development, and the "strategic poverty" in regard to Japan's future welfare. Today, against the background of the fast development of economic globalization, the deepening of economic interdependence of all nations and the growth of regional economic integration, the dichotomy of "sea power vs. land power" haunting Japan's geopolitical scholars and their ideological preaching that go with it are certainly outmoded and harmful to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and peaceful development of international relations in the region, which has already aroused the alert of China and other nations in the region.

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The DPRK-ROK Relationship and the Six-Party Talks

By Shi Yongming

Currently, high intensity confrontation has put the situation of the Korean Peninsula in an irresolvable deadlock. For the US, the only way to break the deadlock is to force the DPRK to change fundamentally and give up the policy of developing nuclear capability. The policy paradox of the US lies in the fact that antagonism will only further justify the DPRK's policy of developing nuclear weapons. From its essence, the US is engaged in a historical gambling, as it expects that long-term political and military pressure as well as economic sanctions would halt the DPRK's nuclear development strategy and there would be internal changes within the DPRK because of the economic difficulties.

It is difficult for the Six-party Talks to restart. Reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK has become more important for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue. Nonetheless, the steps suggested by the ROK in "the Korean Peninsula confidence-building process" have fallen short of the DPRK's expectations. Since the beginning of the year when the two countries talked about reconciliation, the talks have come to a standstill as the two sides can hardly find a common ground. Such a deadlock has put the two countries in an enduring security impasse. No matter how much deterrence the ROK has put

on the DPRK, it has to face a DPRK with growing nuclear capability. While on the other hand, although the DPRK is trying hard to develop its economy and improve the livelihood of its citizens, it can hardly get out of the economic difficulties the international sanctions have brought about. As a result, it is in the interests of both countries to seek for a final solution of the Korean Peninsula issue which includes the nuclear issue through reconciliation. The way to reconciliation should not be a fresh start all over again, but a return to the Six-party Talks and the bilateral agreements already signed.

I.Reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK Has Run into an Impasse

The high intensity confrontation in 2013 has made both the DPRK and the ROK aware that antagonism cannot resolve the issue, but only increases the security risks. As a result, in the beginning of 2014, the tense relationship between the two countries showed some signs of easing. But such a good sign did not last long, as the two countries have once again fallen into antagonism, which has resulted from the fact that the two countries fail to find a common ground for mutual understanding, confidence-building measures and the way to reconciliation.

A.The DPRK and the ROK failed to find a common ground for confidence-building process

Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the DPRK and the ROK has long been in the form of military confrontation, So, for the two sides, one of the necessary measures for the building of mutual trust is to reduce military antagonism. Nevertheless, presently some changes seem to have occurred in regard to their former approach. From the side of the DPRK, the goals of reconciliation it suggested at the beginning of 2014 are still directly concerned with the practical security issue. On January 16 this year, in the “Major Proposals” the DPRK National Defense Commission made to the

ROK regime, it is suggested that from January 30 onward taking the opportunity of the Spring Festival, the two sides take practical measures to stop all kinds of provocations and slanders, stop military operations against one another and the ROK should stop the ROK-US joint military drills of “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” to be held at the end of February, both sides take practical measures to avoid nuclear catastrophe on this piece of land, and that the ROK refrain from introducing the US nuclear strike means into ROK and the adjacent region. The DPRK believed that if these major security measures are put in place, all the issues, in the bilateral relations will be resolved.

But the ROK, believing that “the suggestions made by the DPRK are hypocritical ‘peace offensive’ in reality”, turned them down. ROK’s policy toward the DPRK is first of all based on assurance of “strong deterrence” on the DPRK, which naturally brings about the zero-sum effect in security matters. The growth of deterrence of the ROK on the DPRK will be seen by the DPRK as threats to its security, while the DPRK’s demand that the ROK stop joint military exercises with the US will be seen by the ROK as weakening such deterrence. The mentality of the ROK’s new government is, on the premise of having its own security assured, to gradually accumulate mutual trust through such practical actions as assuring the meeting of separated families. President Park Geun-hye has gone as far as suggesting that a World Peace Park be build at the DMZ as the starting point of the confidence-building process.

Obviously, the DPRK and the ROK differed a great deal on how to build trust. The DPRK wants to build trust through reducing military antagonism, especially reducing the ROK-US joint military drills, while the ROK hopes to accumulate trust gradually through actual exchanges. Their differences on how to build trust have made it more difficult for the confidence-building process, but they do not pose absolute obstacles for the two sides to improve relations. The true

reason that reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK remained at a standstill is that they have different understanding as to the ultimate goal of reconciliation.

B. Different understanding on the issue of the Peninsula reunification

For many years, the only and never changed consensus in the DPRK and the ROK relationship has been that the final way out for the Peninsula lies in reunification. As the issue of reunification is the core issue in the DPRK and the ROK relationship, and related to the basic position and direction of development of the bilateral relations, how to deal with the issue will fundamentally affect the development of the bilateral relations. During the national resistance against the Japanese occupation, there were two major forces in the Korean Peninsula. As a result, which of the two was the true national representative and had the legitimacy to run the country during the post-war nation building became the inherent cause of national disintegration. Although the Korean Peninsula was divided because of external factors, the two sides refused to recognize each other and tried to reunify the Peninsula in spite of the other, which was the cause of the outbreak of the Korean War. Even today, with the two sides agreeing on peaceful reunification, the issue can both be a force to boost reconciliation of the two and a factor to bring about antagonism against one another. As a result, every round of reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK would first of all touch the issue of reunification.

The ROK new government has from the very beginning linked this round of reconciliation with the issue of reunification. On March 28, Park Geun-hye, made three suggestions to the DPRK, namely resolving first of all the humanitarian issue of the Korean nationals of both countries, constructing civil infrastructure for the common prosperity of the two countries and restoring the common identity of the citizens of both countries. But, Park Geun-hye's intention to resolve the issue of the Peninsula reunification after the German

model showed in her speech has produced negative effects on the bilateral relations of the two countries. In her speech, she not only dwelt on the German reunification process, but also spoke ill of East Germany.

Later on, the DPRK Committee of Peaceful Reunification of Korea published an open query on April 23 to Park Geun-hye, questioning her how she will reunify the Korean Peninsula and pointing out that the “system antagonism” of one side annexing the other side with the help of outside forces means war. This time, the DPRK using means of query rather than direct criticism is because it did not get Park Geun-hye’s real idea about reunification and wanted to leave some room for discussing the issue of reunification with the ROK. For the DPRK, Park Geun-hye is different from Lee Myung-bak after all. Nevertheless, the DPRK had to make a query about the difference between her North Korean policy and Lee Myung-bak’s. While on the other hand, the ROK, whether intentionally or unintentionally, remains vague on many key points in regard to the issue of reunification. This reflects that the ROK has different cognition, and that it is faced with a dilemma in policy choices.

C.The DPRK’s clear nuclear strategy has made it more difficult for the two countries to reconcile

The most difficult issue to resolve between the DPRK and the ROK is the nuclear issue, which had long been the issue between the US and the DPRK. After Lee Myung-bak came to office, it also became the major issue between the DPRK and the ROK, as Lee Myung-bak took it as a precondition for the North and South reconciliation, which made the DPRK believe that Lee Myung-bak was hostile to it. Currently, Park Geun-hye’s government is faced with more serious challenges than previous governments on the nuclear issue. Just before Park Geun-hye came to office, the DPRK not only made it clear to establish ownership of nuclear weapons as a national strategy, but also conducted its third nuclear test. As the relations

between the US and the DPRK have come to a deadlock, the resolution of the nuclear issue is far beyond the sight. The antagonism between the US and the DPRK has made the ROK more worried about the DPRK's further nuclear tests.

As a matter of fact, the biggest problem the nuclear stalemate between the US and the DPRK has brought to Park Geun-hye's government is that its policy towards the DPRK was put into a dilemma. The dilemma of the ROK's policy choice lies in the fact that whether it would resolve the nuclear issue through reconciliation, or reconcile with the DPRK before the nuclear issue is resolved. Under the US policy of pressing the DPRK for changes, the ROK, as an American ally, is expected to put sanctions on the DPRK to ensure the success of US policy towards the DPRK, which means that the ROK should take harsh stance on the DPRK. This of course would impede the reconciliation and confidence-building process between the DPRK and the ROK. If the ROK pursues a reconciliation policy towards the DPRK, it would help the DPRK economically. This would weaken the effects of the US sanctions on the DPRK and be opposed by the US.

Park Geun-hye's policy towards the DPRK is just in between of the one pursued by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, which sought the resolution of the nuclear issue through reconciliation and the one pursued by Lee Myung-bak, which sought the resolution through coercion. The one pursued by Park Geun-hye is a very difficult one. Up until now, what we can see is that the ROK pins much hope of the resolution on the changes of the DPRK. But, such hope itself may result in long-term confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK.

II. The Reconstruction of the Bilateral Relations between the DPRK and the ROK Needs to Return to the Accords Signed in the Past

For ROK, if it wants to avoid the situation in which the DPRK and

the ROK are locked in a long-term and dangerous confrontation, and seeks to get rid of the constraint that the confrontation has exerted on its pursuit of becoming a middle power as soon as possible, the ROK should have a clearer understanding of the situation it is in and the ways as well as the goals of the resolution. The best way to resolve the issue between the DPRK and the ROK is not to start all over again, but review what has been learned and return to the accords signed in the past.

A. The ROK should get rid of the constraint of the structural contradictions

Since the founding of the ROK, the country has been divided by two camps, one radical and one conservative. In 1988, the ROK put forward its policy towards the DPRK, against the historical backdrop of the democratization movement within the country and the international situation in the Cold War undergoing drastic changes. The impact of Nixon Doctrine forced the ROK to rely on itself for security. The US-Soviet detente and the internal changes in the socialist countries provided the opportunity for the ROK to promote reconciliation with the North and reunification of the Peninsula through developing relations with China and the Soviet Union. It was under such internal and external circumstances that historical breakthroughs were achieved in the relationship between the DPRK and the ROK in 1990s.

One of the major changes brought about by democratization in the ROK was that the left wing became the chief force to promote reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK. However, the success of democratization did not change the dual structure within the ROK society. In late 1990s, Kim Dae-jung, the leader of the democratization movement, became the president, who began to adopt the “sunshine policy” toward the DPRK. His successor Roh Moo-hyun followed the suite and pursued the policy of “peace and prosperity” toward the DPRK. But, when Lee Myung-bak, the representative of the

conservatives, came to power, he completely denied the policies pursued by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun towards the DPRK. Such denial was based on factional interest within the ROK rather than the fact that the DPRK was developing nuclear capability. Unfortunately, on the Korean Peninsula issue, we saw the Bush administration annul the Nuclear Framework Agreement signed by the Clinton administration with the DPRK first, and Lee Myung-bak abandon the Declarations signed by Kim and Roh with the DPRK leadership later. From this, we can see that the dual structure within the ROK has made it impossible for it to pursue a consistent and stable reconciliation policy towards the DPRK.

In fact, Lee Myung-bak's government criticized that the reconciliation policies of Kim Dae-jong and Roh Moo-hyun failed to stop the DPRK from developing nuclear capability and believed that their policies failed in the end. This has not only neglected the fact that the Six-party Talks have produced the 9.19 Joint Statement, but also failed to understand the trilateral structure of the US, the DPRK and the ROK in the Korean Peninsula and the ROK's position in such a structure. In the post-Cold War era, the only pretext that the US may use to interfere into the Korean Peninsula affairs is the nuclear issue. As a result, the only party the DPRK would negotiate with on the nuclear issue is the US rather than the ROK, as the DPRK and the ROK already signed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in early 1990s. Nevertheless, the US wanted to interfere into and dominate the trend of the situation in the Korean Peninsula on the pretext of the nuclear issue and engaged itself in several rounds of bilateral talks with the DPRK. After the US annulled the Nuclear Framework Agreement signed in 1994, the nuclear issue was discussed in the Six-party Talks, as the bilateral talks on the nuclear issue between the US and the DPRK lacked reliability. Though the issue is addressed multilaterally, the major parties are the US and the DPRK, with other parties helping promote

mutual trust between the two. Soon after the Sept.19 Joint Statement was signed in the Six-party Talks, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, and the direct reason of it was the US put financial sanctions on the DPRK in violation of the reconciliation spirit of the statement. In this case, it is wrong to say that the DPRK's first nuclear test was the result of Roh Moo-hyun's policy failure.

It is worth noting that the US, the DPRK and the ROK are in a structure of contradiction intensification circle on the nuclear issue. The ROK relies heavily on military cooperation with the US for security, but the DPRK saw direct threats in the US, while the countermeasures the DPRK took against the US may be seen by the ROK as threats. The ROK may cooperate with the US to take tough stance on security issues, but if the ROK took positive policies to apply pressure on the DPRK in regard to the nuclear issue or its domestic affairs, they would not produce positive results but intensify the contradictions. The ROK usually follows two policy choice logics in dealing with the triangle relationship, one of which believes that the DPRK has its own security considerations in seeking nuclear capability, so the goal of reconciliation can be reached through building mutual trust and resolving the issue of security, while the other of which gives a definition to the DPRK first and then puts all the blames on it, so as to apply pressure on it to force it to give up nuclear capability and undergo regime change. In reality, on the Korean nuclear issue, the first logic would make headways, while the second one would lead to stalemate. As a matter of fact, it would have been very difficult for the Six-party Talks to produce the Sept.19 Joint Statement without the reconciliation policies pursued by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun towards the DPRK. When the Six-party Talks came to a halt, although the unbridged difference between the US and the DPRK on the issue of nuclear inspection is the direct cause, what is more important and behind the scene is the fact that the worsening relationship between the North and the South made

the DPRK lose hope in building up mutual trust with the US and the ROK on security matters. As a result, under the circumstance that the US dominates the nuclear issue and the DPRK takes a key position, the ROK does not have an advantageous position in the triangle structure of the US, the DPRK and the ROK. If the ROK wants to play the role it should play and achieve good results, it should conduct rational thinking and work out an independent and stable policy, in which wisdom rather than force should be used.

B. Returning to the accords signed in the past can help accumulating trust

The biggest challenge the ROK's Korean Peninsula confidence-building process is faced with is how to deal with the relationship between the bilateral treaties already signed and the future "accumulation of trust". As Lee Myung-bak had already set aside the declarations signed by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun with the DPRK, and the DPRK announced the abolition of all the bilateral treaties, the two countries are in a state without any effective bilateral treaties between them. Park Geun-hye government's policy towards the DPRK does not involve any previous bilateral treaties. If the "accumulation of trust" process starts without any bases, it would be very difficult.

If the ROK wanted to overcome its disadvantageous position in the triangle structure, it should reach consensus domestically on basic issues concerning the two countries and ensure that its policies on these issues remain consistent when dealing with the bilateral relations with the DPRK. By doing so, it could be possible for the two countries to accumulate trust. To reach such a goal, the two sides should appreciate the bilateral treaties signed in the past. Most importantly, the past treaties have almost included all the basic structural issues in their bilateral relations, which reflect the historical process of their mutual understanding. Only through review of these treaties, by inheriting and developing them in particular, could the

two countries find ways out for reconciliation in the future.

In retrospect of the reconciliation process between the DPRK and the ROK, there are two basic issues that cannot be neglected: the reunification issue and the West Sea (Yellow Sea) issue.

On the reunification issue, the DPRK and the ROK reached agreement on “Three Principles of Unity” in 1972, of which the principles of “independently” and “peacefully” are indisputable. But the two sides have great contradictions over how to incarnate the principle of “transcending the differences in ideology, beliefs and systems”, which is similar to the principle of “one country and two systems”. The current reunification policy of the ROK government has given the DPRK the impression that it would follow the German model of “unity by absorption”. In fact, the difference between Germany and the ROK lies in the fact that since Brandt put forward the “Ostpolitik” in 1969, West Germany had consistently pursued the reconciliation policy towards East Germany and insisted on the idea that compatriotism should overtop “systems” and “ideology”. So, the new government of the ROK should inherit the past consensus reached on the reunification issue and pursue a consistent reunification policy. Only by doing so will there emerge a situation in which the two countries would “feel close to each other” and “accumulate trust”.

Since the end of the war, the issue of the West Sea is where the two countries collide most, as the armistice agreement did not include the issue. Since the armistice agreement did not make a demarcation for the two countries at the West Sea, General Clark, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command then, drew a warning line on the West Sea in August 1953, which was later called the Northern Limit Line. But since 1973, the DPRK has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the line. In 1976, the DPRK drew a line on the West Sea extending from the border line between the Hwanghae-Do and the Gyeonggi-Do, which was called the Southern Warning Line,

and claimed jurisdiction of territorial water 12 nautical miles into the West Sea from the shores, which has caused quarrels between the two countries. As a result, the West Sea issue has been a basic issue in the reconciliation process of the two countries, which has often been discussed since the two countries began to seek reconciliation. In 1999, the DPRK unilaterally proposed a line, demanding to incorporate into its jurisdiction the five islands and the adjacent waters that the ROK had occupied since the truce, which caused military conflicts between the two countries around Yeonpyengdo in 1999 and 2002. As we can see, the issue of West Sea is a serious impediment to the reconciliation between the two countries. If the ROK refrains from resolving the issue through dialog, it certainly is not conducive to the confidence-building process of the Korean Peninsula, and will further weaken its position and role in the triangle relationship. To change this situation, the most effective and direct way is to return to the spirit of reconciliation expressed in the Oct.4 Joint Statement, and include the West Sea issue into the track of resolution through dialogue.

C.A return to the Six-party Talks will ensure lasting peace

Another relational difference between South-North Korea and East-West Germany is that the bilateral relationship between the South and North is subject to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The issue of denuclearization is an international issue, and not an issue within the bilateral relations of the two countries. But, the nuclear issue is closely related to the reconciliation issue, as they both can promote each other and block each other. As reconciliation can help resolve the nuclear issue, the deterioration of bilateral relations would make the resolution of the issue more difficult. The same is true the other way around. In early 1990s, reconciliation occurred between the two countries, which obviously had positive effect on the resolution of the nuclear issue. On January 7 1992, the ROK announced the cancellation of joint military drills with the US

that year, on January 20, the DPRK and the ROK signed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula, and on January 30, the DPRK signed the Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, which indicated that it would be easy to resolve the nuclear issue from the perspective of common security and the joint efforts made by the DPRK and the ROK could provide the necessary condition for the resolution of the nuclear issue. These two judgments have proved to be in ups and downs in the later rounds of the Six-party Talks.

As a matter of fact, in view of the parallel development of reconciliation between the DPRK and the ROK and the denuclearization process of the Peninsula started from the end of 1980s, we found out that the development of bilateral relations between the DPRK and the ROK has been constrained by outside factors brought about by the nuclear issue. The ROK has tried to break away from such constraint, as Roh Moo-hyun once proposed that the ROK play the role as a balancer in Northeast Asia, and President Park Geun-hye put forward the “Concept of Peaceful Cooperation in Northeast Asia” (known as the Seoul Process). These are expressions of such an aspiration. Roh Moo-hyun boldly put forward the “peace and prosperity” policy for his proposition, while Park Geun-hye seemed constrained by various factors. One of the chief reasons is that the two countries cannot resolve the issue of common security through reconciliation, as the issue of Peninsula security is closely related to outside factors. History has determined that if the DPRK and the ROK wanted to resolve the issue of common security, they should resolve the nuclear issue and the issue of regional security framework at the same time. The Six-party Talks just provides such a platform for the DPRK and the ROK to get to this goal.

Roh Moo-hyun hoped to put up a show with the two Koreas acting as the main performers on such a platform. In 2007, he signed the Oct.4 Joint Statement with Kim Jong-il, which not only elaborated

how to develop the bilateral relations between the two countries, but also proposed “a mechanism of lasting peace” be built through the Four-party talks, and tried hard to promote the Six-party Talks and implement the Sept.19 Joint statement and the Feb.13 Joint Document “to resolve the issue of peace of the Peninsula”.

In fact, when the Six-party Talks entered its later phase, it has become a common consensus that “the resolution of the nuclear issue needs to build a peninsula peace mechanism”. But, to get to such a goal calls for reconciliation and cooperation between the DPRK and the ROK as the foundation, which is both a challenge and an opportunity for the two countries. The two countries cannot build lasting peace in the Peninsula without the platform of the Six-party Talks. If Park Geun-hye’s Korean Peninsula confidence-building process fails to restart the Six-party Talks through reconciliation of the two countries, it will be a luxury for them to reach the goal of peaceful reunification. For the ROK, it should build its security system from the macro perspective, rather than leave its country’s destiny to the alliance with certain superpower. An arrangement which can put ROK itself at the center of regional affairs can make the Peninsula in a lasting peace and greatly raise its international influence.

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