Domestic Cognition and Position on THAAD Deployment in South Korea

By Lyu Chunyan & Xu Wansheng

There has been a decision process within the government of South Korea from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” with regard to accepting THAAD deployment in the ROK. On July 8 of 2016, the Park Geun-hye government of South Korea formally declared its decision to allow THAAD deployment  in South Korea. To this, political parties and various social circles within South Korea expressed varied cognitions and positions, which not only revealed the deep division and opposition within South Korea on the issue of THAAD deployment, but also reflected from one side the negative impact of THAAD deployment in South Korea that would damage the regional strategic balance.

I. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Strategic Choice of South Korean Government

Since the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK came up, till the end of 2015, the South Korean government had assumed a position of “strategic ambiguity”, responding negatively to the external concerns in an “evasive” way to avoid intensifying contradictions with the neighboring countries including China. During this period, the South Korean government always denied discussions with the US on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. Nevertheless, there appeared some differences between the South Korean government’s denial of discussions with the US on THAAD deployment in the ROK and the relevant information revealed by the US, which may indicate that there do exist discussions “under the table” between the US and the ROK on THAAD deployment in the ROK. In addition, although the South Korean government has denied discussions with the US on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, it has never denied the possible prospect of deploying THAAD in the ROK.

Entering 2016, against the backdrop that North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear tests, the expressions of the South Korean government on the issue of THAAD deployment became “positive and definite”, and made a quick decision to allow THAAD deployment in the ROK. On January 25 of 2016, South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo expressed that from military perspective, it was necessary to discuss matters concerning THAAD deployment in the ROK, which may be understood that Han Min-koo showed a positive position on THAAD deployment in the ROK from a purely military point of view. On the 4th of March, a joint working group of the US and South Korea responsible for consultation on THAAD deployment by the US forces stationed in the ROK was established, which started the formal consultation between the two countries on the schedule, the site and the cost of THAAD deployment. On the 8th of July, South Korea and the US declared to the outside world the decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea from the perspective of the ROK-US alliance.

Meanwhile, the South Korean government further emphasized that the decision to deploy THAAD in the ROK was a matter within the scope of national sovereignty, which was not targeted any third party except North Korea. Since Park Geun-hye was impeached on December 9 of 2016 for the “bestie of hers meddling with national policies”, Prime Minister Kwang Kyo-ahn acted as the acting president, who showed the will to implement the decision of THAAD deployment in the ROK despite the political unrest.

We can find from the above sort-out that although THAAD deployment in the ROK was decided upon by the South Korean government in a relatively short period of time in the first half of 2016, it was a policy issue that had existed for years and been carefully considered by the South Korean government, which was a strategic choice made by the Park Geun-hye government after a comprehensive consideration over the situation of the Korean Peninsula and the international relations with the major powers in the Asia Pacific region.

II. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Mixed Reactions of the Political Parties in South Korea

On the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, there has never been a consensus among the major political parties within South Korea, which has made the party politics characterized by confrontation between the government and the oppositions more complex.

In the political circle of South Korea, the call for THAAD deployment came first from a congressional inquiry raised by the ruling New National Party. On November 3 of 2014, at a congressional inquiry conference on government televised to the whole nation, Congressman Yoo Seong-min from the New National Party strongly advocated an early deployment of THAAD in the ROK, formally starting the policy debate between the government and the opposition parties on THAAD deployment in the ROK. The US Ambassador to the ROK Mark Leppert was attacked on March 5 of 2015, which has not only led to the decline of the influence of the domestic left-wing parties that opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK, but also made the strong advocate by Yoo Seong-min of early THAAD deployment in the ROK quickly becoming a public opinion, while the New National Party has decided to endorse THAAD deployment as the party’s stance.

Different from the ruling party, the opposition parties, out of the need of checks and balances as well as contention for power, would keep distance from the government and the ruling party on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, mostly taking ambiguous or opposing attitude.

On the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, the biggest opposition party DPK has taken an attitude of “strategic ambiguity”, as it would not make THAAD deployment in the ROK as a “position for the party”. Within the party, the leadership as represented by the party chairman Kim Jong-in has taken an attitude that “if the deployment brings actual benefits, it would not oppose it”, while some congressmen from the party ran contrary to the opinion of the leadership, claiming that the decision process of THAAD deployment in the ROK was problematic. The second biggest opposition party PP has opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK, as its congressman Ahn Cheol-soo proposed a referendum on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. The third biggest opposition party JP has also opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK, as its congressman Kim Jong-dae advocated that the deployment should be approved by the parliament.

Entering 2016, the momentum of the biggest opposition party DPK further expanded, which forced the party to adjust its policy advocate on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. On April 14 of 2016, the results of the 20th parliamental election came out, with the ruling New National Party failing to obtain more than a half of the 300 parliament seats, which made the opposition DPK the biggest party in the parliament, resulting in a situation of “weak government and strong opposition” in the parliament for the first time in 16 years. On August 28, DPK held the second national meeting of its parliament members, which elected Choo Mi-ae as the new party leader. Different from her predecessor Kim Chong-in, who assumed an ambiguous and relatively neutral attitude on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, Choo Mi-ae has always opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK. When interviewed by the media after elected as the new party leader, Choo Mi-ae expressed that she would make the opposition to THAAD deployment in the ROK as a unified policy of the party, to prevent conflicts between China and the US in the Korean Peninsula. In its operations in the parliament, DPK united with other opposition parties to jointly oppose THAAD deployment in the ROK.

In 2016, the tendency of DPRK’s nuclear and missile development was a major external factor that influenced the policy position of the South Korean opposition parties on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. For instance, on July 19, both the ruling party and the opposition parties unanimously condemned the missile test, with a range covering the whole of South Korea, conducted by DPRK earlier that day, but assumed entirely different attitudes from one another on THAAD deployment in the ROK. The ruling New National Party took the opportunity of DPRK’s repeated provocation to further stress the necessity of THAAD deployment in the ROK, while the opposition parties of DPK and PP tried to avoid discussing the issue of THAAD deployment or expressed denial. Additionally, DPRK conducted the fifth nuclear test on September 9, which was the largest in history that forced the South Korean opposition parties to “soften” their position on THAAD deployment in the ROK. On September 20, according to the reports of the South Korean media, DPK’s leader Choo Mi-ae said her party would fully study the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK and there would be no final time-table for writing the opposition to THAAD deployment into the “party policy”, while in the past she had insisted on writing it into the “party policy”. And the ex-Chairman of PP Ahn Cheol-soo expressed that “if China refused to put sanctions on DPRK, it would be reasonable for THAAD deployment in the ROK as a way of self-defense”, while in the past he took the lead in writing opposition to THAAD deployment in the ROK into the “party policy”.

Entering 2017, the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK is becoming the drogue for the presidential election in South Korea. On the issue of the US and the ROK accelerating THAAD deployment process in the ROK, the ruling Liberty Korea Party and the right-wing opposition Bareun Party believed that it was reasonable to complete THAAD deployment in the ROK as scheduled, as it would relieve the burden of the next government if the deployment is completed before the election. In contrast, the mainstream opposition parties, such as DPK and PP, have expressed strong opposition, believing it might violate the constitution and requesting the acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn to put aside the disputes and leave the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK to the next government, as they believed the matter should not be promoted by a government impeached by the people. Besides, the ex-Chairman of PP Ahn Cheol-soo expressed concern over the government accelerating THAAD deployment process in the ROK, advocating that the government should make detailed explanation of the decision process on THAAD deployment in the ROK to the public.

III. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Division of South Korean Public Opinion

Within South Korea, the interest groups that support THAAD deployment in the ROK mainly include the military (including the armed forces and the military industrial complex), the support base of the ruling New National Party, the elderly that are concerned with security issues and groups that attach importance to the US-ROK alliance.The interest groups that oppose THAAD deployment in the ROK mainly include the residents of Seongju-gun, the chosen site for THAAD deployment; some residents of Gyeongsangbuk-do, to which Seongju-gun belongs; the support bases of most of the opposition parties; the young that are concerned with the economy; people from the economic circle who have trade relations with China; and the intellectual elites who have the comprehensive interests of South Korea in mind. As early as the issue of THAAD deployment came into being, the South Korean National Association of Economists took the lead to oppose it.

As the public opinion surveys indicated, there have been greatly varied cognitions of the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK at different phases of its development, which has made the South Korean society seriously divided. For example, at the time when the South Korean government assumed an attitude of “strategic ambiguity” and made no decision on THAAD deployment in the ROK, South Korea’s JoongAng Ilbo published its survey results in February of 2015 that 55 percent of the interviewees agreed with THAAD deployment in the ROK as “it was intended against the threats from DPRK”, while 32.6 percent of the interviewees opposed the deployment as they considered “relations with China and Russia”. A year later, when the South Korean government decided to discuss the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, according to the South Korean public opinion survey published by Realm eter in February of 2016, 49.4 percent of the interviewees agreed with the deployment, while 42.3 percent opposed it. When the US and the ROK formally decided to deploy THAAD in South Korea, in accordance with the public opinion survey by Gallup Korea published in August of 2016, 56 percent agreed with THAAD deployment in the ROK, while 31 percent opposed it.

Against the background of the public opinion division found in the surveys, the social mass movement against the THAAD deployment in the ROK did have certain impacts on the government decision process and forced the South Korean government to change the site for THAAD deployment in the ROK.

In addition to the survey results and social mass movement, the public opinion division on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK has also shown in the form that there are some South Korean intellectual elites worrying about the development prospect of the China-ROK relationship. In reality, for South Korea, the tensing relationship between it and China is bound to hit its domestic economy, as the South Korean economy is highly dependent on China’s market. In 2015, South Korea’s export to China was about 26 percent of its total export, with more than US$ 50 billion trade surplus from the trade with China, while Chinese tourists visiting South Korea accounted for 45 percent of the total tourists visiting South Korea. As a result, after the Park Geun-hye government formally decided on THAAD deployment, those duty-free shops, hotels, travel agencies and on-line retailers that depend heavily on China became so worried about their sales performance, that the news about China placing “bans on South Korea” got fermented within the South Korean society.

The division of the public opinions within the South Korean society reflected from an angle the weighing of advantages and disadvantages as well as gains and losses by various interest groups in South Korea based on different stances, putting some kind of pressure on the government decision of THAAD deployment in the ROK. Although it cannot fundamentally change the decision on THAAD deployment in the ROK, it remains one of the variables that affect the development of the political situation in South Korea.

In sum, in the political process of THAAD deployment in the ROK, the South Korean government has changed from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” on the basis of comprehensive security considerations, while the ruling party and the opposition parties have never had consensus on the issue and the social opinions have remained seriously divided. This plural opposition in cognitions and stances not only has reflected the evolution and complex effects of THAAD deployment in the ROK, but also has increased the uncertainty of the South Korean political development, which has in turn damaged the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

(Both of the authors are Professors and Doctoral Supervisors from the PLA University of Foreign Language. This article was received on May 30, 2017.)