Trump’s Foreign Policy Posture of HisFirst Hundred Days in Office

Shen Yamei

The first hundred days of the US new president in office is usually called the “honeymoon period”, which is the key period for the president to show his leadership style and expand his influence of power. As a result, the “first hundred days” has become an index for measuring the new president’s merits. To evaluate Trump’s diplomatic performance in his first hundred days in office cannot go without the evaluation of the diplomatic legacy left over from his predecessor. Currently, the appraisal of Obama’s foreign policy by the public opinion suffered mixed fortunes, reflecting deep considerations of the US diplomatic orientation, which cannot be neglect by Trump and will constrain his impulse to completely overthrow his predecessor’s foreign policy. From the new foreign policy of his first hundred days in office, Trump has established the purpose that foreign policy should serve the domestic agenda, reshape the trade and security agendas, and continue with the Middle East, Europe and Asia-Pacific as geostrategic grips, which has shown the process of his “learning curve”. With the contention for decision influence within Trump’s diplomatic and security team emerging, it is expected that his diplomatic decision in the future might generally tend to be self-restrained and prudent, but the possibility of partially aggressive strategies cannot be excluded. The China-US relationship is entering a more difficult run-in period, with friction and cooperation as well as challenges and opportunities co-existing.

I.Currently, “Easier Said than Done” for Trump’s Diplomacy

Given the relative stability of the Obama administration’s foreign policy and inconsideration of Trump himself having experienced the election campaign and sent clear political signals, Trump is not under the pressure to start something new in diplomacy by “opposing his predecessor”. His diplomatic proposals reflect “what are really in his mind”, which can be said to truly reflect his intentions. Although the US mainstream media has persisted in “badmouthing”, asserting Trump’s foreign and security policies are entering “unknown waters” and implying possibility of greater international turmoil, Trump has shown a relatively clear “learning curve” in his “first hundred days” in office. His policy proposals such as reshaping the alliance and restructuring trade relations are returning to mediocre, and his anti-Russia and anti-China postures have taken a major reversal, embodying that his diplomatic thinking is returning to tradition after realistic grinding, so that there are both Chinese and American scholars coming to the conclusion that Trump’s diplomacy is “old wine in a new bottle”.

A. Diplomacy is based on “American First”. The election in 2016 has reflected that the Western society as represented by the US is confronted with the “hollowing” of the Middle Class and the backlash against globalization, while the pressure of resource allocation and employment competition brought about by huge influx of refugees have intensified the anti-elite and popularism sentiment. Trump upholds two basic values in his governance ----“American First” and “Make America Great Again”, with the revitalization of American economy and improvement of American people’s livelihood as the top-most goals of his administration, as he has pledged to wage a defending war to return to and strengthen “American characteristics”, and protect the “beautiful country under God”. To this end, since the beginning of his administration, Trump has spoken bluntly about putting domestic affairs first and boldly carried out political, economic and social reforms, in pursuit of immediate results in a short run. As reflected in diplomacy, the US, driven by radical nationalism, is made trying to get out of the burdensome responsibility of global affairs by pursuing tough egoist diplomacy, revising the over liberalized international line and adjusting its foreign policy. Affected by social anxiety, Trump’s diplomacy is seen in the form of general contraction. There even have been suggestions that the US get rid of the burden of leading the international affairs, as the “American leadership has never gained broad international support, with new science and echnologies further diluting America’s power and influence, which have made relative efforts too expensive”.

Presently, the basic consensus within the American strategic circle is that the US national security is confronted with three major rivals: IS is the pressing matter of the moment, Russia poses potential threats and China is a long-term challenge. In view of this, Trump has stuck to eliminating the hidden troubles in American economy, society and security, and explicitly made fighting against IS as the US diplomatic theme. Of course, for a political novice without much experience and whose words and deeds are full of controversy, it is quite possible, when internal troubles multiply, that Trump would take tougher measures in diplomacy to mitigate domestic pressures. In areas directly related to American actual interests, partial aggressiveness would likely increase, as shown in the US military retaliation to Syria chemical weapon incident earlier last April, which may reflect the domestic needs from certain respect for Trump to consolidate his reign.

B. To highlight the trade and security agendas. Currently, as the external economic environment the US is confronted with is not so optimistic, there does exist with strong political sentiment against free trade within the US society, resulting in Trump’s diplomatic agenda quickly transformed into domestic agendas, especially economic and trade agendas. For example, Trump has attributed the declining of the US manufacturing to “trade failures”, and further attributed the latter to its trade partners using such unfair means as “exchange rate manipulation”. As a result, the US should “use trade policies to protect American sovereignty and make use of all means to open foreign markets for American exports; and not tolerate such unfair trade practice that would distort the market as exchange rate manipulation, unfair government subsidies and misappropriation of intellectual property rights”. Moreover, the US would go further to restructure the international trade rules. Between last February and March, the US Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Treasury Munuqin went to Germany respectively for G20 foreign ministers’ meeting and G20 finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting, starting the efforts that would “focus on fairness and restructure trade relationship”. From  the facts that Trump has demanded the “fair-sharing” of defense expenditure with its allies and even has once linked the “One-China” principle with China making trade concessions to the US, Trump is inclined to “commercialize” international relations, set the price for political relations and principles of political communication in accordance with the formula of “American First”, and indulge in the negative “trade” and “zero-sum” thinking.

Another outstanding agenda of his is military and security. In fact, Trump has relied mainly on the defense industry to get elected, as the important basis to “Make America Great Again” is military expansion. In addition, there are several retired generals taking important positions within the Trump administration, including the three major decision makers in the area of national security, namely Secretary of Defense Mattis, National Security Advisor McMaster and Secretary of Homeland Security Kelly. From the White House budget proposal published recently, about 18 departments of the government will undergo 20 percent budget cut, while the defense budget will increase by 10 percent, which has shown Trump’s determination to strengthen military capabilities and the possibility that military forces would become the major tools for Trump’s diplomacy.

C. To revitalize three strategic blocks. As restricted by the US interest demands and internal as well as external environments, Trump’s adjustment on specific foreign policies assumes the feature of both change and continuation. The basically stable and constant elements include: safeguarding America’s international leadership, taking strict precautions against the challenges posed by other major powers, using democratic values as means to realize national interests, and taking military alliance as the grip. The changes would include: the relative decline of the US power and its international influence, the rise of distrust of the US by its allies, and increasing introverted inclining of the US. Presently, the external strategy of the Trump administration continues to take the strategic blocks of the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe as pivot and grip, with the US strategic layout undergoing no fundamental or subversive changes.

First, the new round of policy adjustment has taken the Middle East as the “pressing matter of the moment”, with heavy attack already in place. The Trump administration has deemed IS as a global threat and changed the cognition by re-weighing the importance of counter terrorism and overthrowing the Syrian Bashar regime. On the tactical level, although the US hoped to end the war in Syria through some kind of cooperation with Russia, the more pressing matter for the US is to impede Russia’s strong return to the Middle East and reverse the situation that the US is unable to lead the political process in Syria. Trump has obviously increased proactive diplomatic actions in the Middle East, including increasing military deployment in Syria and launching air attacks, extending the Iran Sanctions Act, inviting the leaders of both Israel and Palestine to visit the US, sending high officials to visit Turkey and Iraq, and hosting an international conference on combating terrorism on the 22nd of last March in Washington D.C. to fight against IS with the participation of foreign ministers from 68 countries.

Second, “the Pacific region is still one of the priorities”. As the US has exited from the TPP, the US Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton declared that “Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is ended”, which was misinterpreted by some media as the signal that the US would withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. In reality, since getting into office, Trump’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region have increased rather than decreased. The US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State have respectively paid exclusive visits to countries within the region. To Japan, the US has reiterated its commitment to help defense the Diaoyu Island; to the ROK, the US is promoting the deployment of THAAD on time; to China, the US has emphasized that “the definition of China-US relations can only be friendly”; to India, the US has called India a “true friend and cooperation partner” in coping with global challenges. The Trump administration has also regarded the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as its primary concern in Asia-Pacific security, reappraising policy options towards DPRK, intimating to strike DPRK militarily, concentrating the US strategic weapons to Northeast Asia.

Third, the US-EU relationship continues to progress despite constant bickering. Trump once highly praised “Brexit”, “bad-mouthed” the EU and the “pressing matter of the moment”, with heavy attack already in place. The Trump administration has deemed IS as a global threat and changed the cognition by re-weighing the importance of counter terrorism and overthrowing the Syrian Bashar regime. On the tactical level, although the US hoped to end the war in Syria through some kind of cooperation with Russia, the more pressing matter for the US is to impede Russia’s strong return to the Middle East and reverse the situation that the US is unable to lead the political process in Syria. Trump has obviously increased proactive diplomatic actions in the Middle East, including increasing military deployment in Syria and launching air attacks, extending the Iran Sanctions Act, inviting the leaders of both Israel and Palestine to visit the US, sending high officials to visit Turkey and Iraq, and hosting an international conference on combating terrorism on the 22nd of last March in Washington D.C. to fight against IS with the participation of foreign ministers from 68 countries.

Second, “the Pacific region is still one of the priorities”. As the US has exited from the TPP, the US Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton declared that “Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is ended”, which was misinterpreted by some media as the signal that the US would withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. In reality, since getting into office, Trump’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region have increased rather than decreased. The US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State have respectively paid exclusive visits to countries within the region. To Japan, the US has reiterated its commitment to help defense the Diaoyu Island; to the ROK, the US is promoting the deployment of THAAD on time; to China, the US has emphasized that “the definition of China-US relations can only be friendly”; to India, the US has called India a “true friend and cooperation partner” in coping with global challenges. The Trump administration has also regarded the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as its primary concern in Asia-Pacific security, reappraising policy options towards DPRK, intimating to strike DPRK militarily, concentrating the US strategic weapons to Northeast Asia.

Third, the US-EU relationship continues to progress despite constant bickering. Trump once highly praised “Brexit”, “bad-mouthed” the EU and the “pressing matter of the moment”, with heavy attack already in place. The Trump administration has deemed IS as a global threat and changed the cognition by re-weighing the importance of counter terrorism and overthrowing the Syrian Bashar regime. On the tactical level, although the US hoped to end the war in Syria through some kind of cooperation with Russia, the more pressing matter for the US is to impede Russia’s strong return to the Middle East and reverse the situation that the US is unable to lead the political process in Syria. Trump has obviously increased proactive diplomatic actions in the Middle East, including increasing military deployment in Syria and launching air attacks, extending the Iran Sanctions Act, inviting the leaders of both Israel and Palestine to visit the US, sending high officials to visit Turkey and Iraq, and hosting an international conference on combating terrorism on the 22nd of last March in Washington D.C. to fight against IS with the participation of foreign ministers from 68 countries.

Second, “the Pacific region is still one of the priorities”. As the US has exited from the TPP, the US Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton declared that “Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is ended”, which was misinterpreted by some media as the signal that the US would withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. In reality, since getting into office, Trump’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region have increased rather than decreased. The US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State have respectively paid exclusive visits to countries within the region. To Japan, the US has reiterated its commitment to help defense the Diaoyu Island; to the ROK, the US is promoting the deployment of THAAD on time; to China, the US has emphasized that “the definition of China-US relations can only be friendly”; to India, the US has called India a “true friend and cooperation partner” in coping with global challenges. The Trump administration has also regarded the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as its primary concern in Asia-Pacific security, reappraising policy options towards DPRK, intimating to strike DPRK militarily, concentrating the US strategic weapons to Northeast Asia.

Third, the US-EU relationship continues to progress despite constant bickering. Trump once highly praised “Brexit”, “bad-mouthed” the EU and “played up to” Russia, which has indicated Trump’s deviation from the norms, so that Tusk, President of the European Council, wrote to the leaders of the EU member states, calling Trump as “one of EU’s biggest external threats”. Both before and after British Prime Minister Teresa May and German Chancellor Merkel visited the US, their bilateral relationships with the US are full of noises. Nevertheless, Trump has sent important cabinet members to Munich Security Conference, NATO defense ministers’ meeting, and he will personally attend the NATO Summit to be held in May, reiterating his determination to “strongly support the NATO” and reconfirming NATO as the “cornerstone” for the US and the entire Transatlantic Community. After the incident of “secrete communication with Russia” got fermented, Trump has taken a sharp turn to show toughness on Russia, demanding Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine, increasing military deployment in the frontline states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, and strengthening operations to contain Russia. The US-Russia relationship has once again fallen into the old mold of geostrategic gaming, which may be of some help to mitigate Europe’s worries that the US could fail in its security commitment to Europe, so that the US-Europe relationship could be stably maintained on the expected track with their differences under the control.

D. Contention for influence over diplomatic decisions has emerged. Since assuming office in January of 2017, Trump has met repeated setbacks,  which have hastened his breakaway from the political circle in Washington D.C., seriously undermined his authority as the new President, strengthened the public impression that his cabinet team does not run very well, though it has to be proved. It is reported by American media that the advisory team of the White House has broken into three factions: one led by the White House chief strategist Bannon, adhering to the ultra conservative ideology; one led by his family members, namely Kushner and Ivanka, taking a relatively liberal stance; and one composed of the mainstream Republicans, such as Vice President Burns and the White House Chief of Staff Priebus. These factions blame one another on personnel assignment and policy propositions, causing a quite chaotic situation. There have also appeared different factions on trade policies, with the unyielding Navarro, Chairman of the White House National Trade Commission on one side, and the US Secretary of Treasury Munuqin, Secretary of Commerce Ross and Chairman of the National Economic Council Cohen stand orthodox on the other, as the former is losing power in the game-playing with a tendency of being marginalized. As President Trump is inexperienced in diplomacy, he will rely more heavily on the opinions of his diplomatic team and professionals. Under the influence from different sides, especially with the need to keep balance among different factions, President Trump has to face deep level contradictions and long-term constraint of various kinds, which would make him more self-disciplined and prudent in his decisions, resulting in relatively eclectic and conservative schemes for practice in the end.

II.Prospects

In the early phase after taking office, Trump seemed to be hostile to the whole world, with the Islamic world, refugees, media, the EU and all American economic rivals at once becoming the subjects of his struggle. Contrary to his internal reforms, which are loud but fruitless, Trump’s policy adjustment in diplomacy began with coarseness and impulsion, but staggering along towards clarity.

In recent years, the trend of American foreign policy adjustment indicates that the alliance system that has supported American hegemony since the end of the Second World War has partially been weakened, which has forced the US to attach more importance to the voices made by other countries on international affairs, pursuing an external strategy characterized by overall contraction and partial expansion. A fact that cannot be neglected is that the US Intelligence Committee warned in a recent report entitled Global Trends: Paradoxical Progress published every four years that “the Pax Americana is coming to an end, as the rising process of the West has gone into reverse, while the weight of Asia in global economy is recovering”, which happened to coincide with the worries of the Western mainstream media lasting for some time that the world is entering the “post-truth, post-West and post-order” age. Hereafter, would Trump’s diplomacy safeguard the liberal international order the US has carefully molded over the 70 years since the end of the Second World War or overturn it? Would he only resort to conflict management on hot issues or engage in a military confrontation that could lead to a war? What effects would he bring to the regional situation around China and international situation? These are issues worthy of our concern.

With regard to China-US relationship, as the heads of both states met earlier last April for the first time at Mar-a-Lago in Florida, engaging in strategic communication on such topics as bilateral trade, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, regional and international security, the China-US relationship has gotten out of the jolt caused by the Taiwan issue earlier and will hopefully get stabilized on the strategic level. The two countries have also established four high level dialogue mechanisms, namely the diplomatic and security dialogue, the comprehensive economic dialogue, the law enforcement and cyber security dialogue, and the social and humanistic dialogue, as well as started the 100-day plan, which are conducive to the realization of an orderly “docking” in their cooperation agenda.

It can currently be seen that the Trump administration is inclined to “do business” rather than “engage in confrontation” with regard to China-US relationship, with the pragmatist mentality on China increasing. On the 18th of March, US Secretary of State Tillerson, when exclusively interviewed for the first time on China-US relationship, said “China and the US are discussing issues that would determine the future directions of the two countries in 50 years”, which has in fact repudiated the notion that the relations between China and the US have been intensified to the “breaking point” alleged by the American media. High ranking officials of the US State Department have expressed several times at briefings that the Trump administration wished to construct a “result-oriented”, constructive and mutual-beneficial China-US relationship, calling people to refocus their attention from the wording and grammar of China-US relationship to the practical issues. It is expected that China-US relationship will return to stability after short-lived frictions or even tremor, with increasing space for the expansion of bilateral cooperation.

Looking forward to the future, the difficulties should not be belittled, as stress factors in China-US economic and trade relationship have made the running-in more difficult. First, the anti- globalization trend and the calls against free trade will make it difficult to eliminate the stress factors in China-US economic and trade relationship. Second, from Trump’s consistent expressions on China, he is rather ignorant about the complexity of China-US relationship and inclined to put pressure on China as he, from the economic perspective, saw the US trade deficit with China as the biggest external agent that has made the US economy problematic, and attributed American difficulties to China. The game-playing between China and the US is likely to return to the traditional front, namely their potential frictions will mainly concentrate on trade, security and the Taiwan issue, with the two sides playing “political cards”, “economic cards” and “security cards” in a mixed way, which would definitely make their bilateral relationship more confrontational. Last, the overall cognition of American strategic circle on China tends to be negative, resulting in constant increase of American toughness on China.

In addition, we should also see that the profound evolution of globalization is changing the world pattern, in which the US dominance in world affairs and its ability to reform the world is decreasing, with some of its allies in the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe beginning to consider seriously the “Scheme B” for the “post-America” and “post-West” world. Correspondingly, China’s interaction with the international order is entering a new era, which calls China to engage in long-term planning and formulate a comprehensive global strategy and strategy toward the US, so as to play a bigger role in interacting with the US and the world by proactive scheming.

(The author is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies. This article was received on May 4, 2017.)