The Construction, Analysis and Countermeasures Research of China-US Nuclear Strategic Stability Relationship

Wang Zhijun & Zhang Yaowen

With an end to the Cold War and the progress of nuclear disarmament, although the fear for “Armageddon” caused by nuclear weapons is drastically diminishing, it is still the major strategic weight that determines the relationship between China and the US. In order to manage China-US nuclear relationship, the US once put forward the initiative of strategic stability relationship.

I. The Connotation and Features of the US Concept

of Nuclear Strategic Stability

The driving force for the escalation of a nuclear war that existed in the Cold War era still exists today. As both China and the US are very sensitive to the nuclear posture and nuclear strategy of the other, whenever tensions tend to bring about crises in their relationship, they would take whether or not to upgrade the tension to a nuclear war as an important trade-off in their decision-making. For this reason, in the US Nuclear Posture Review issued in 2010, China was mentioned 36 times, while constructing nuclear strategic stability relationship with China was suggested. Nevertheless, as the US initiative stops at conceptual documents and lacks details for further contact, it is both controversial and questioned. As a result, to clearly define the connotation and features of the concept of the US nuclear strategic stability is the prerequisite and basis for managing China-US nuclear strategic relationship.

A. The Connotation of the US Nuclear Strategic Stability Concept

First of all, this concept is the extension of the concept the US adopted during the Cold War to manage its nuclear relationship with the USSR. “Nuclear strategic stability” once meant the crisis stability that the US and the USSR achieved through ensured mutual destruction and managing their nuclear relationship by treaties, namely the two countries could carry on their arms race on the basis of balance of power, while avoiding a nuclear war. Such crisis stability or terror stability would make neither of the two countries dare to launch an eliminating strike on the other and both of them are vulnerable to each other, which would lower the possibility of a war and serious crisis. And now, the US has transplanted this old concept into China-US nuclear relationship.

Secondly, the US has extended the connotation of the nuclear strategic stability concept in accordance with the times. The US believed that the world of today is different from the one that was in the “Second Nuclear Age” when the US and the USSR were head on in full confrontation: nuclear force has now been much reduced; the number of nuclear states has increased, which has brought about a multidimensional security dilemma; nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have become a global threat; advanced and non-nuclear military technologies are offsetting or have offset the strategic significance of nuclear weapons, especially those weapon systems not limited by “no first use”, which can both attack nuclear forces, destroy satellites, threaten command and control systems, and accelerate nuclear modernization as well as enhance delivery capabilities.

Lastly, this concept is intended for China and implies hostility, as the US intends to maintain the existing nuclear power disparities and keep China from acquiring relative power. Recently, the US Secretary of Defense Carter expressed that the US would increase the input of nuclear power, which went against Obama’s promise to cut down US nuclear weapons and his intention to adopt “no first use of nuclear weapon” policy before the end of his term in office and it is obviously intended for China.

B. The Features of US Nuclear Strategic Stability Concept

First, it is objective and rational. Nuclear strategic stability accords with the political direction for the development of China-US relationship, which is conducive to managing and controlling the crises, and avoiding nuclear war, as it basically reflects the current reality of diversified and multidimensional nuclear security, and recognizes and defines more clearly the position, role and responsibilities of both countries in regional and international security.

Second, it is empty and vague. Although the US has called for nuclear strategic stability with China, it never considers seriously the effective measures for establishing strategic stability, nor would it be fully prepared to achieve the strategic stability, letting alone accepting any single principle as the basis on which to construct US-China strategic relationship. It is difficult for the US to get out of the “strategic ambiguity” and into “strategic trust” with China.

Third, it is of combat deterrence. Since acquiring nuclear capability, the US has issued successive strategies, such as “massive retaliation”, “flexible response”, “mutual assured destruction”, “limited nuclear war”, “flexible and selective engagement”, “pre-emptive strike” and “nuclear free world”, whose core meaning is power deterrence, hoping to “make the potential rivals aware that if they launch an invasion, losses would be much greater than gains that they would give up wars with the US, so as to ensure US security interests in such a way”.

Last, it is asymmetrical and not operable. The gap of nuclear power between the US and China is huge, and their nuclear capability is asymmetrical. As a result, it is improper to introduce the strategic stability between the US and the USSR (Russia) under symmetrical structure to the US-China relationship under asymmetrical structure.

II. Differences and Contradictions between China and

 the US on the Issue of Nuclear Strategic Stability

The strategic contradictions between China and the US impede the formulation and implementation of the concrete plans and procedures of strategic stability, while the tactical ones between them impede the agglomeration of their strategic consensus.

A. The Strategic Contradictions that Affect China-US Nuclear Strategic Stability

First, it is the dispute of institutions and ideologies. There exist the ideological and social system differences between China and the US, as the socialist China led by the Communist Party has been the focus of criticism by the conservative and liberal forces within the US. A Rand report pointed out that the US policy toward China is to promote democracy in China and overthrow the communist regime. The US believes that China is a threat and challenge to the Western institutions, civilization and developing model.

Second, it is the contradiction of strategic positioning. Although China has proposed such concepts as “strategic partnership” and “new type of major country relationship”, the US either rejected them or remained reserved to them. The US deemed that to construct the new type of major country relationship between China and the US threatens American hegemony, its essence is to promote China’s interests at the cost of hurting American interests. Whereas, the proposals the US has raised such as “stakeholders” and “G2” are intended to maintain the status quo of the current relationship between the two countries.

Third, it is the contradiction of core interests and major concerns. The US has been engaged both openly and covertly in subverting China’s regime by manipulation, plotting and penetration, obstructing China’s reunification, inciting regional division, instigating “Color Revolution” in Hong Kong, and militarily intervening maritime rights disputes, while accusing China for challenging its regional leadership, with a purpose to drive the US out of the Pacific and threaten the security and development interests of the US, its allies and partners.

Fourth, it is the contradiction of strategic inequality and disparity. a. Disparity in their strategic intentions. The US is only trying to lure China to get into dialog with the US so as to make China more transparent, while refusing to make any promise to curb its military ambition over China. b. Seeking advantageous stability. The US requires China to respect its leadership, while denying the position China deserves to have. c. Bundling strategic stability. The US has insisted in bundling with its allies and partners to bargain collectively with China for strategic stability, demanding China to remain restraint and keep to its security commitment, while ignoring China’s security. d. Disparity in military applications. The US has requested China not to attack its satellites and not to wage a cyber war on the US, while extending its strategic protective umbrella to its cyber space and outer space, and constantly raising the level of joint security.

Last, it is to exclude and vilify China. The US has taken an ABC (anyone but China) strategy towards China: politically, emphasizing the unity of democratic countries and vilifying China’s system and development path; economically, excluding China and promoting TPP; militarily, strengthening and expanding military cooperation with its allies to cope with China jointly, as its enhanced THAAD and PAC-3 systems are as a matter of fact intended for guarding against China. The strategic contradictions have made the mutual distrust between China and the US increase and the two fallen into the “Tacitus Trap”.

B. The Differences and Contradictions between China and the US on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons

First, it is the issue of building a nuclear free world. Both China and the US have proposed to build a nuclear free world, but the US has refused to give up nuclear weapons. The US has developed the old triad composed of intercontinental missiles, submarine launched missiles and strategic bombers of the Cold War into a new triad of offensive strike system composed of nuclear and conventional forces, active and passive defense system and the reserved response infrastructure that can respond quickly to a variety of threats. The US is trying to weaken others while maintaining its own dominance in nuclear and conventional capabilities.

Second, it is the issue of building and developing nuclear weapons. China has from the very beginning followed the principle of developing defensive nuclear weapons which are “small but effective”. Whereas, in order to maintain the high efficiency and flexibility of its nuclear forces, the US Congress has continued to provide funds for extending the life-span of its current nuclear weapons for another 20 to 30 years, and developing as well as deploying new strategic delivery systems, with the funds increasing from US$ 2.5 billion in 1989 to US$ 10 billion in 2020

Third, it is the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. China has insisted on the “Three-no” principle on the use of nuclear weapons and proposed at the China-US Security Dialog held in 2008 that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons on the US. Whereas, the US claimed that it would use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances: “if China used WMD to attack the US and its allies, the US would exclude no means to react militarily”, “it means that if China used military means to resolve the Taiwan and the South China Sea issues, the US would use nuclear weapons first”.

Fourth, it is the issue of mutual deterrence. China has hoped that the US “would give promise and build the bilateral strategic relationship on the basis of mutual vulnerability”. However, the US not only feared that not accepting mutual deterrence would bring about an unbearable nuclear arms race, but also feared that accepting mutual deterrence would hurt American superiority and its allies’ trust. Moreover, what the US fears more is that the “strategic decoupling” of nuclear and conventional weapons would make China more confident and adventurous. As a result, the US would not accept mutual deterrence from the very beginning. In recent years, the US has not only deployed strategic ballistic missile submarines and new type of heavy bombers that could carry nuclear projectiles adjacent to China, but also sent various kinds of reconnaissance equipment to monitor China’s nuclear weapons and planned “to use its monitoring capability to locate China’s ICBMS, and in the first round of attack use 500 nuclear warheads plus conventional global strike weapons to destroy most of China’s targets”. Additionally, the US would use BMD sensors and interceptors to destroy China’s surviving retaliation capabilities, so that China’s nuclear weapons would not be able to reach the US.

Last, it is the issue of extended nuclear deterrence. The US has insisted that it would not develop China-US relationship “at the expenses of its interests, its allies and its partners”, and strengthened its extended deterrence under the pretext of the North Korea’s nuclear issue and the so-called “increase of China’s confidence”, stressing that “nuclear attacks on its allies in Northeast Asia would instigate a kind of retaliation which might include the choice of using nuclear weapons”. China believed that the extended nuclear deterrence is a nuclear expansion in disguise and the alliance policy, as well as the extended nuclear deterrence formed one of the major causes of mistrust between China and the US.

III. The Major Impediment to Nuclear Strategic

 Stability Lies with the US

It is the American values, security concepts, bias as well as hostility towards China that impede the concretion and practice of strategic stability between China and the US.

First, the concepts of “manifested destiny” and “religious mission” of the US have affected the practice of nuclear strategic stability. The Americans have tended to take a religious understanding of their national origin and mission, with a deep-rooted savior consciousness and a belief that they are the “Chosen Ones”. When confronted with a growing China, the mentality of “religious mission” of the Americans is playing its part. The US held that China’s speedy economic growth has become the biggest potential ideological challenge to the liberal democratic capitalism, as most of the threats to the US “concentrated in the Pacific region and related to China”, and “China has posed the critical threat to the US in many fields, such as intelligence and S&T, WMD and its proliferation, outer space confrontation and regional security in Northeast Asia, and other regional issues”. These viewpoints are doomed to restrict mutual political trust between China and the US, and damage the basis of strategic stability.

Second, the concept of absolute security of the US impedes the strategic cooperation of nuclear security between China and the US. The US has long emphasized maintaining its absolute security, putting its security above those of others and tolerating no violation of its survival and development security. As the US has extended the “Monroe Doctrine” to the Pacific region and sought hegemony in the Pacific, it “does not tolerate China to obtain the rights and interests it deserves in the Western Pacific”, but rather asked China “to provide credible assurance that it would not challenge the US leadership in regional order with its rising military might”. On the global issues, the US asked China to be a “responsible major power”, which means in the final analysis to be responsible for the US. Ignoring China’s core interests and major security concerns, the US is seeking absolute superiority and security, which has made it impossible for China and the US to start formal dialog on the issue of nuclear strategic stability.

Last, the US has unreasonably held bias and hostility against China. The US has long taken China as the “others”, attributing the tension in China-US relationship to “China’s strengthened coercive acts in maritime disputes and cyber activity that have caused chaos”. On the issue of military capacity, the US has surmised that China might develop offensive CBWs and the number of its nuclear warheads would exceed those of the US and Russia; China’s nuclear policy has changed to first use of nuclear weapons, and would join hands with Russia to oust the US from the Pacific and challenge its global dominance. The US is redeploying and adjusting its armed forces, with China as its combat target to make sure that in the future it can have enough military capacity to deter the foes and maintain its superiority in any potential conflicts. This would certainly increase the mistrust between China and the US in a spiral rising way.

IV. Nuclear Strategic Stability Calls for Joint Efforts

and Consensus of China and the US

As contradictions between China and the US intertwine with their common interests, nuclear strategic stability can only be expected by fostering strategic consensus between the two countries, focusing on common interests, resolving differences and contradictions, going from opposite directions, and interacting in a benign way.

A. China and the US should Consolidate Strategic Foundation by Following such Concepts or Principles as Stated below

First, it is the Chinese word “Xin”, which may stand for belief, trust and credibility. Mutual trust between the two countries calls for: a. There ought to be belief. We must take the peaceful development of the two countries’ relationship as the unshaken belief, with which there will be motivation. b. There ought to be trust. Both China and the US are big powers. Big power means “grandness”, which lies in the integrity of making and keeping to its pledges. The declaration of the big power should be often taken as highly trustable rather than simply interpreted as “conspiracy theory”. c. There ought to be credibility. Trust cannot just stop on words, as it calls for concrete policies and actual actions. Only the integration of words and deeds can manifest sincerity and obtain trust.  

Second, it is the Chinese word “He”, which may represent “harmony but not sameness”. China and the US should take “harmony” as the principle, respecting each other, accommodating the other’s national institutions, development path and development model, improving mutual trust, seeking “harmony” rather than “sameness”, and neither side should impose its own standards on the other and force it to accept.

Third, it is the Chinese word “Deng”, which may mean equality and reciprocity. Equality means equality in identity and position, and there is no superiority or inferiority in race and system; every country has the equal right to safeguard its security and rights for development, and has the equal opportunity to participate in international affairs and acquire resources, institutions and institutional guarantee. Reciprocity means reciprocity in the main action bodies and interest levels, and there should be no unequal trading of light for heavy, small for big and a few for many. Only by doing so, can the hegemonic country avoid repeating the tragedy of overexpansion that leads to decline and shake off the “hegemonic burden” that breaks down the bearer. Speaking specifically, there should be reciprocity of country to country and region to region, rather than forcing one country to make security pledges to several countries and requiring unilaterally one country to bear responsibilities and obligations beyond its sovereignty; negotiations should be conducted at the same interest level, and never allow low level interests outmatch the high level interests; adhere to the principle of asymmetrical factual equivalence, as it is absolutely unequal to ask the countries without equal ability to bear equal responsibilities and obligations. China and the US should recognize the reality between them that there is a mismatching and lack of correspondence between security needs and capability.

Last, it is the Chinese word “Huo”, which may stand for flexibility, fresh and alive, and vitality. a. There should be flexible thinking and new ideas. We should not be based our ideas on mode thinking and incomplete historical experiences, which might lead to strategic rigidity. b. Strategic thinking should be fresh and alive. China and the US should adjust their respective policies in accordance with the new features of the world, the status quo of their development, and the changes of their power contrast, rather than following a stereotype routine and clinging to bygone values. c. The two countries should engage themselves in cooperation in view of the future, world peace and development, deepen mutual understanding, show sincerity to each other, and inject vitality into the improvement of their bilateral relationship.

B. An Exploration of Countermeasures to Cope with the Differences and Contradictions on China-US Strategic Stability

First, the nuclear free world and nuclear disarmament. There is no need for China and the US to get tangled with the goal of the nuclear free world, but instead they should be focused on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. On nuclear disarmament, China’s advance or retreat depends on the American moves and the demonstration of the US and Russia. First of all, the US should be self-disciplined, make plans to withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed overseas, and draw up roadmap to ban nuclear tests comprehensively, after which the US should make corresponding commitment of no first use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the consensus reached of not to use nuclear weapons on each other. Secondly, China and the US should cut down their nuclear weapons or develop their nuclear weapons on the basis of equal deterrent capabilities, as China must maintain the bottom line of the regional nuclear balance.

Second, the construction and development of military capabilities. In fact, the nuclear contradiction between China and the US is the issue of national security orientation based on military capabilities. First, military capability is the pillar for national security and development. It is beyond reproach that China and the US develop their respective military capabilities compatible with their respective positions and needs to provide public security. Furthermore, as they have far more onerous military tasks than guarding against each other, there should not be a tit for tat attitude. Second, weapon systems are neutral forces, while the armed forces are political tools. The quantity and quality of the armed forces are not the source of threat, while it is the people who influence or draw up strategies and policies that play the decisive role. China and the US should shake off the yoke of technicality and view the military strength from the perspective of philosophy and politics. Third, although military capability is indispensible, it is not everything. Superstition in military superiority and worshiping simple military victories would lead to self destruction, while military strength however strong may have weaknesses and deficiencies. As a result, to cope with China’s military modernization, Washington should avoid falling into the trap of a new Cold War.

Third, the issue of mutual deterrence. First, China and the US should reach a consensus on no first use of nuclear weapons to each other and accepting mutual deterrence. As China has long adhered to the principle, the US should make bigger moves towards this end. Second, China and the US should view each other’s nuclear strategy rationally. Although China has recognized the reality and the strategic needs of the US to maintain strong nuclear deterrence, and would not participate in the nuclear arms race, it would not give up its right to develop nuclear capacity appropriately. Third, strategic deterrence should be mutual. The interdependency between China and the US is deepening, but the risk of a war should not be underestimated because of this. It is conducive to strategic stability that China and the US accept mutual deterrence. Now that the US has insisted on the “leadership plus deterrence” strategy, it should understand China’s “determination of mutual nuclear deterrence” and unshakable will of nuclear counter attack. As a logical starting point, the US should recognize and accept the legitimacy of China’s nuclear retaliation capabilities and support the idea of mutual deterrence. Fourth, mutual deterrence may be normalized and operable.

Fourth, the issue of missile defense systems. The issue of missile defense is a focus of struggle between China and the US. The US has stressed that its missile defense is intended for the intercontinental missiles of North Korea and Iran, and not for China’s long-range nuclear force. But at the same time, the US has recognized that “with the (American) deterrent system growing stronger, its (North Korea) threat has become more incredible”, “China’s major short-range conventional missile capabilities, especially the ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that threaten the US military forces stationed in the Asia-Pacific region and its allies as well as partners, are the legal and necessary targets for the US to develop the theater missile defense system”. The path to break the deadlock is as following: both sides should not cover up their strategic intentions, as transparency of intention may strengthen mutual trust; respect each other’s rights to have balanced offensive and defensive capabilities, and if the US would not give up its missile defense system, China must have the rights to develop its offensive and defensive capabilities, and the three-dimensional operation capacity to counter-balance the US armed forces deployed adjacent to China; set up the bottom line of fighting no battles, reach the consensus of not to upgrade and stimulate nuclear counterattacks, establish the crisis evaluation standard, perfect the crisis management mechanism, and establish the “trading halt” mechanism for crisis escalation.

Fifth, the issue of extended nuclear deterrence. a. The US should not seek asymmetrical interests under the pretext of maintaining regional stability and making true its security commitment. “Preventing China’s nuclear attack” is a false proposition, as China has insisted on the “Three-no’s” nuclear principle, peaceful reunification, and peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime rights and interests disputes; and as most of the US allies have no plan to go to war with China, regional stability could be maintained without the US intervention. Even if China goes to war with a neighboring country, there would be no fear of nuclear war without American intervention. b. The US giving up its extended nuclear deterrence is the only way out for nuclear non-proliferation and maintaining regional stability. The US extended nuclear deterrence policy is the impediment to nuclear non-proliferation, which hurts China’s rights and interests, increases China’s misgivings, and erodes the sincerity and momentum of China-US cooperation. China and the US can also engage themselves in the construction of nuclear non-proliferation mechanism, while strengthening joint monitoring, management and the promotion of the denuclearization process in the Korean Peninsula. If it is the case, the region would benefit from the stability between China and the US, and their bilateral relationship would be more constructive and the international security cooperation would be more effective. c. The US could only make conditional security commitment, while China would safeguard its rights under the premise of abiding by the principle. First, the US should view the regional territorial and maritime disputes as well as the so-called freedom of  navigation and over-flight historically and justly, rather than confounding right with wrong; second, the US should take no actions in the form of subversion, devastation and splitting with regard to the Chinese regime, sovereignty and reunification; third, the US should not provide security endorsement and unconditional military assurance for its allies to expand their disputed rights and interests. As for China: it should stick to the stand of peaceful reunification and peaceful resolution of disputes; it should make known the red line and bottom line for resorting to arms, and also make clear explanation of the possibility of breaking the no first use of nuclear weapon policy; it should cognize the US special relationships with its allies and partners under the premise of ensuring its core interests, stay away from the words and deeds that would stimulate the US and make sure that China and the US would not head for conflicts that may upgrade to a war.

(Wang Zhijun is professor from PLA Nanjing Army Command College and Zhang Yaowen is lecturer from PLA Nanjing Army Command College.This article was received on Sept. 20, 2016.)