An Initial Analysis of Trump’s Foreign Policy Trends

Yuan Zheng

On the 20th of January, Mr. Trump will get into the White House, becoming the 45th president of the US. Mr. Trump’s policy claims during the 2016 election campaign and his unique words and deeds after elected demonstrated the differences in policy principles from those of the Obama administration. As a result, the internal and external policies of the Trump administration, especially its foreign policy trends, have become the focus of attention of all parties.

 I. The US Foreign Policy Trends under President Trump’s Administration

Although the foreign policy claim Trump has made is rather unclear, the inclination of neo-isolationism is obvious. Compared with the traditional isolationism, this neo-isolationism has its own outstanding characteristics: it does not mean that the US would neglect foreign affairs, but it would rather engage in strategic contraction, focusing on key regions and issues, while unwilling to intervene in less important regions and issues; the US would pay more attention to the resolution of its domestic problems, while reducing its attention to the outside world, with the willingness to undertake international responsibility declining and resources invested into it reducing. Trump has emphasized the inward contraction, claiming that “to resist foreign aggression, the house should be made in order first”, and stresses be put on solving domestic issues.

“American First” reiterated by Trump during the election campaign will become the main tone of its foreign policy. What is the so called “American First” is that the US would be more concerned with its own interests, while ignoring the considerations of other countries, even including its allies. The Trump administration would promote whatever favors American practical

interests with all its might and force other countries to compromise. As for the multilateral international cooperation, it would take a negative attitude, unwilling to take more responsibilities, which means that unilateralism might increase in future American foreign policy. And this accords with the traditional ideas of the Republican Party. Of course, it is very difficult for the rising of unilateralism of this intensification to reach the level of almost crazy paranoid during the first term in office of George W. Bush.

“To make America great again”, was the slogan raised by Trump during his 2016 presidential election campaign, which was not of his original making, but was raised by Reagan in 1980, when running for presidency, against the background in which the US was confronted with internal economic stagnation and external aggressive pressure from the USSR. Reagan was the person Trump held in esteem. In his idea, “to make America great again” meant to revitalize the economy and strengthen national defense, which corresponded with the composition of the cabinet members he has nominated, as the wealthy and generals have taken the important positions.

The US strategic focus is not likely to change fundamentally, which would continue to be on the Asia-Pacific region, investing more political, economic and military resources into this region. Although fighting the ISIS in the Middle East may to some extent attract American attention, it is not likely that the Trump administration would deploy large number of ground troops into the region, and instead would fight the extremist and terrorist forces by Special Forces on the ground, Air Force, and cooperation with or pressing on relevant countries. Trump opposed the overthrowing of certain regimes in the Middle East by his predecessors, believing that such practice would create power vacuum in the region and provide opportunities for the terrorists to gain an upper hand. In his belief, gradual reform would make the Middle East change. The bulk of the expanded US Air Force and Navy would be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region rather than the Middle East or Europe, as the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy pursued by the Obama administration was the bipartisan consensus of the Democrats and Republicans. Even if Trump gets into office, the Asia-Pacific region remains the strategic focus of the US, where its major interests lie. Although Trump’s Asia-Pacific strategy may not be called the rebalancing strategy, the investment of the US into this region will be consistent. The Trump administration will be likely to enhance the US military presence in the Western Pacific and maintain American military superiority, which is more important under such circumstances that the economic pillar as TPP is missing in the Asia-Pacific strategy of the US. Trump has reiterated that he would withdraw from TPP after getting into office, replacing it with bilateral trade and economic agreements.

Alliance relationship remains the major pillar for American hegemony. Trump’s argument to withdraw US troops from Asia may only be meant to put pressure on its allies and partners, with an aim to make its allies and partners assume more obligations of self-defense, contributing either more people or more money. It is of little possibility for the US to withdraw all of its military forces from Asia. Confronted with the rise of China and the development of North Korea nuclear weapon, the US-Japan and US-ROK alliances are  likely to be strengthened rather than weakened. The Trump administration will also be likely to attach importance to the feelings of its European allies, intentionally maintaining and strengthening the role of NATO. In fact, that the US demanded its allies or partners to assume more responsibilities of self-defense does not begin with Trump. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has adjusted its relationship with its allies, enhancing its cooperation with allies and demanding them to share more defense responsibilities. The idea of “smart power” introduced by the Obama administration soon after getting into the reign advocated strengthening cooperation with allies and demanding its allies to share responsibilities. Trump has merely continued such a tendency and expressed such an appeal to the utmost.

In the future, the Trump administration intends to improve relations with Russia, which is a major development that deserves attention. All in all, in today’s world the interaction of the China-US-Russia triangle is bound to affect the development of the entire international pattern. In reality, the US strategic circle deemed that the worsening relationship between the US and Russia has put China in a very advantageous position, which enables China to win advantage from both sides. As a result, the US should reverse this passive situation by improving relations with Russia. The friendliness and positive evaluation of Putin that Trump expressed during the election campaign and the transition period, as well as the recent benign interaction between them have added to the speculation of the outside world. Meanwhile, Flynn and Tillerson whom Trump has respectively nominated as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State for his administration have had benign interactions with Putin and advocated improving relations with Russia, which has provided necessary conditions for the improvement of the US-Russia relationship. Trump has intended to cooperate with Russia in fighting the ISIS and solving the Syria issue, which may improve the atmosphere for better relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, Rome is not built in one day. The improvement of US-Russia relationship takes time, as enhancing mutual trust, lifting sanctions and stopping the compression of Russia’s strategic space cannot be achieved over-night. Moreover, the foreign policy of Trump is different from that of the Obama administration, while there are different voices within the Republican Party, as the mainstream establishment school represented by Senators John McCain and Marco Rubio has openly opposed Trump’s intention to get closer to Russia.

Although it calls for further observation, we can basically determine the general foreign policy trend of the Trump administration based on the study of his words and deeds and his team as well as the traditional ideas of the Republican Party. Of course, when coming into office, Trump has to confront such legacies of his predecessor as the declining of US power and its ability to dominate the world. First of all, Trump after coming into power has to face a divided American society, with the bulk of his energy likely devoted to domestic affairs. Trump is somewhat lucky to win the presidential election by getting the majority of the electoral votes, as he was lost to Hilary Clinton in universal suffrage by about three million votes, which may indicate that Trump’s footing in general voters is not firm since half of them supported him while another half opposed him. Such a division would pin down Trump in his administration. Faced with a torn society, the first issue Trump has to solve is how to bridge the differences and mitigate the social contradictions. Trump would come across great difficulties and be caught in a dilemma unless he solves these issues well. Secondly, factionalism remains intense, as the Democrats refuse to retreat. Trump would meet with no small resistance in overthrowing Obama’s legacies on such issues as climate change, environment protection and Medicare. Third, the Republican Party is not monolithic within itself, as the traditional mainstream establishment school and the Republicans on the far right may not stand together with Trump. On the contrary, division may occur on specific issues, which can only be analyzed issue by issue. For instance, the Democrats, having close relations with labor organizations, usually support trade protectionism, while the Republicans traditionally enjoy good relations with big businesses and transnational corporations, who may be beset with worries over Trump’s policies of trade protectionism. Last, the measures taken by the Trump administration in the name of “American First” can bring about harsh response or even retaliation from the target nation or even its allies, which may pose impediments to Trump’s populist moves.

II. The China Policy of the Trump Administration

It must be said that Trump, the in-coming president of the US, would bring more variables to China-US relationship. From what he said during the election campaign, Trump’s stance on China is quite likely to change, which is even self contradictory and has a lot of uncertainties. Trump, as an outsider, when coming into the core of national power, would need some time to adapt to the complicated relations within the regime. Furthermore, Trump is not cognitive of the complexity of China-US relationship in which competition and cooperation co-exist, which Trump needs some time to learn. But Trump held that the China policy of the Obama administration was rather weak, proposing to take a tough stance on China. As a result, during the initial period of the Trump administration, it is quite likely that the China-US relationship would undergo some jolts.

As mentioned afore, after coming into power, Trump would continue US layout in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing political, economic and military investment; trying to compress China’s strategic space; besieging the expansion of China’s influence; and doing it’s utmost to safeguard US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. So, the competition and game-playing between China and the US in Western Pacific will be intensified.

The foremost challenge is that the trade friction between China and the US will be aggravated, which may include the possibility of a trade war breaking out on certain products (for example, anti- dumping of iron and steel). During the election campaign, Trump was once heard as saying that after taking office he would identify China as a currency manipulator, levying 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods. Meanwhile, Steven Nouchine, Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro nominated respectively by Trump as Treasury Secretary, Commerce Secretary and Chairman of the White House National Trade Commission all supported Trump’s policy claims of tax reduction internally and the reverse of trade disadvantages externally. Currently, Trump’s team is considering two ways to implement trade protectionism: first, levy 10 percent tariff on all imported products; second, levy the so-called border adjustment tax on import and export products, especially on the products American companies manufactured overseas. It is certain that after coming into office, Trump would face strong emotion of trade protectionism within the US, when he, considering keeping his campaign promises, has at least to introduce some concrete measures to levy punitive tariffs on or set tariff barriers against some of Chinese products, which would raise the possibility of trade frictions between China and the US. Under such circumstances, bilateral consultation and negotiation on certain issues, including the Sino-US Bilateral Investment Treaty, would be affected.

Of course, although the possibility of trade and economic frictions between China and the US is likely to rise substantially, it is not quite possible that the US would levy 45 percent tariffs on Chinese products. In the final analysis, the US and China are the largest and second largest economies of the world, and their interdependency has been deepening, with China as the biggest trade partner of the US. If trade war broke out between them, both sides would suffer. A report published by the well-known think-tank Peterson Institute for International Economics indicated that if to levy severe tariffs on Chinese and Mexican products just like what the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump insisted, the US economy would be likely to fall into recession, making America lose 5 million jobs.  

For China, as the Taiwan issue concerns its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is the most important and sensitive issue in China-US relationship. Nonetheless, a lot of Trump’s words and deeds recently are controversial, which have touched China’s bottom line. On December 2nd of last year, Trump was on telephone with Tsai Ing-wen and called Tsai the “President of Taiwan”, which is the first breaking of the conventions since China and the US established diplomatic relations 37 years ago, sending out an alarming signal to the world. But, the emergence of such emergencies is not at all beyond expectations.

Traditionally, the Republican Party, which is against communism and pro Taiwan, has maintained close relationship with Taiwan. In fact, some scholars from such right-wing conservative think-tanks in the US as Project 2049 Institute, American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation have published a huge number of articles in newspapers and on the internet to gain momentum for the US to adjust its Taiwan policy, preaching the elevation of Taiwan’s position in the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, criticizing the quandary of the Obama administration on the Taiwan issue, and demanding the US government to define the role of Taiwan clearly and give more support to Taiwan.

Although Trump seldom expressed himself explicitly on Taiwan issue during the election campaign, people can see the Taiwan policy orientation of Trump’s camp through reading the Republican election platform of last year. In this platform, the Republican identified with Taiwan in values and ideology, mentioning nothing about “One China” policy and the three joint communiqués, but instead it insisted that the US-Taiwan relationship would continue to be based on the Taiwan Relations Act, with the “Six Assurances” written for the first time into the platform, advocating to “assist Taiwan with its self-defense” and give Taiwan “strong support”, while “praising the new regime in Taipei for its efforts to keep constructive relations across the Strait, and calling the mainland China to respond”. In reality, the campaign team of Trump has been identified with the Republican election platform.

Trump has been surrounded by quite a few people who are either pro Taiwan or hard liners on China. Reince Priebus, appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the White House, has been known firmly pro-Taiwan, whose appointment is said to arouse “rejoicing” in Taiwan. Peter Neva Lo has written a lot in support of Taiwan, including works that play up the “China threat”. Stephen Yates, an adviser of Trump’s transition team and one having deep relationship with Taiwan Green Camp, is a former US official and the draftsman who openly supports Taiwan and has written the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances into the Republican election platform.

Based on the above analysis, one may have reasons to believe, the Trump administration would give more support to Taiwan, while being harder on China. In other words, once Trump is in power, both the possibility and the extent for the US to adjust its Taiwan policy are increasing.

In sum, with Trump coming to power, the US tends to be tougher in its China policy and China-US relationship is to face serious challenges. Nevertheless, the international pattern that Trump’s team is facing has changed drastically, and it has to accept the reality that American power is declining. As a result, in the future the general situation, in which competition and cooperation co-exist between China and the US, will not change fundamentally, as both sides are not willing to run into an all-out confrontation. What China has to do is to remain self-confident and calm, concentrate all its energy on doing its own things well, while resolutely safeguard its core interests, and deter and counterattack any external provocations.

 (The author is Director and Research Fellow of the Section of American Foreign Policy Studies, Institute of American Studies, CASS and Guest Research Fellow of the CPDS. This article was received on Jan. 3, 2016)