Abstracts for Volume 1 of Peace and Development in 2018

Viewing the International Significance of the 19th National Congress of CPC from the Historic Height of Human Progress

by Shi Yongming, Associate Research Fellow from China Institute of International Studies and Guest Researcher of CPDS. The nature of human development is making progress continuously, which is not only the driving force for but also the goal of development. The process of human development is very complicated. Since entering modern history, Europe has made important progress in political system as well as scientific and technological productivity, while capitalist production mode has also brought with it savage aggression and expansion as well as imperialist wars. In the wake of World War II, the major human progress has been seen in establishing the basic principle of sovereign equality and mutual nonaggression, which has laid the foundation for further human progress. But since the end of the Cold War, the Western countries led by the US have not only got trapped in the dilemma of the end of history in cognition, but also turned the clock back in political security, making human progress lose direction. Responding to the important problems of the times, the report to the 19th National Congress of CPC has not only elaborated on China’s basic experiences and concepts in national rejuvenation centered on seeking progress and drawn the blueprint for China’s future development, but also show the direction for human progress. Nonetheless, for human as a community with shared future, how to achieve development depends on the choice of different nations.

Rethinking the “Period of Strategic Opportunity” in the New Era

by Wang Dong, Associate Professor from School of InternationalStudies, Peking University and Deputy Executive Director of China-US Human and Cultural Exchange Research Base, Peking University. In 2002, the report to the 16th National Congress of the CPC proposed, “for our country, the first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunity, which we must seize tightly and which offers bright prospects.” This is the overall and fundamental strategic judgment of our party on the basis of comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the internal and external situation. Since entering the new era, from the historic junction China is in as well as the internal and external situation facing China, we can make such judgment that China is still in the strategic opportunity period during which great achievements can be made. The formation and continuation of the strategic opportunity period not only depend on the domestic and international objective factors, but also can be proactively shaped. To take a firm hold of the strategic opportunity period, we must do our own things well first; second, we must manage well our relations as a rising power with the world, especially with the United States that dominates the international systems and our neighbors; and last, we must also actively participate in and provide guidance for the reforms of global governance and the transformation of the global order.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the Trump Administration: Policy and Limitation

by Chen Jimin, Associate Professor from the Institute for International Strategic Studies of the Central Party School of the CPC and Guest Researcher of CPDS. The Trump administration wishes to realize its strategic vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region by promoting the synergy and merging of its alliance system with the partnerships, deepening economic and trade relations on a fair and reciprocal basis, advancing the pattern of military presence in an all-round way centered on seeking peace with strength, and maintaining a forward diplomatic presence. Nevertheless, this strategic vision willbe restrained by the following factors: the governing philosophy of America First pursued by the Trump administration will result in the lack of internal dynamics to boost this strategy, the imperfectness of Trump’s administrative team and the countries in the region “betting on two sides” will result in the lack of implementation capacity to advance this strategy, and the issue of coordination between advancing the Indo-Pacific strategy and developing diplomatic relations with China.

A Review of Trump’s National Security Strategy

by Liu Chang, Assistant Research Fellow from Department for Developing Countries Studies, CIIS. The first National Security Strategy of the Trump administration depicts in a campaign language to the world a world order full of power politics and zero-sum game, and caught in fierce competition as he has seen it, whose core concept is that the American view of the world is changing fundamentally as the engagement strategy that supported American diplomatic policies in the past is collapsing and there is a need to use principled realism to guide American diplomacy and define American national interests, regional strategies and ways of conduct. Meanwhile, the unfriendly attitude toward China found in this strategy may cast a shadow over the development of China-US relationship and pose certain challenges to China-US relationship on three levels, namely bilateral interaction, regional competition and cooperation, and global governance. To understand and grasp the changes in Trump administration’s views over strategy, security and values revealed in this strategy will be of great significance for us to know the governance style of the Trump administration, engage in diplomacy with the US, and maintain the overall development of China-US relationship.

On the Election of Japan’s 48th House of Representatives and the Trend of the Abe Cabinet

by XuWansheng, Professor and DoctoralSupervisor from Information Engineering University, the Strategic Support Force and Guest Researcher of CPDS. The election of the 48th House of Representatives of Japan was held ahead of time, which was a political decision made by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe based on such calculations that cabinet support was picking up, the Liberal Democratic Party was at the leading edge, the Democratic Progressive Party was on the downturn, and the emerging political forces had not been surefooted yet, resulting in the division of the Democratic Progressive Party and the hasty establishment of the Party of Hope and the Constitutional Democratic Party. During the election campaign, three forces, namely the two ruling parties (the Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito Party), the Party of Hope and the Japan Restoration Party, and the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, were locked in fierce contest over such policy issues as the rising of consumption tax, nuclear power, and constitutional revision. Although the victory of the ruling coalition might be attributed to many factors, the weakness and division of the opposition parties could be taken as the major cause, so that the voters could do nothing but voted for the ruling coalition parties. As the Abe cabinet established after the election takes on a long-term ruling situation, its policy tendency to continue with the Abenomics, intensify the pressure on North Korea, and promote constitutional revision are worthy of our close attention.

The Trend of Diplomatic Adjustment of the Abe Cabinet and the Future China-Japan Relationship

by Dr. Sun Wenzhu, Assistant Research Fellow from the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, CIIS. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party won the election of the House of Representatives once again in October 2017, which brought hope for Abe to stay firmly in power until 2021. After winning the election, Abe has persistently implemented his established policy objectives, whileadjusting his diplomatic policies. Hereinto, Japan’s policy toward the US will change from “dancing to the US tone” to “active coordination” and with regard to policies on international and regional issues, Japan is trying to change itself from a “participant” to a “trendsetter”. Abe’s China policy is also tending to be practical, but there is still a negative side remaining. The diplomatic adjustment of the Abe administration is not only a respond to the changing international and regional landscape, but also an intent to meet the needs of promoting domestic political agenda in a hasty way. The trend of Japanese diplomatic adjustment offers an opportunity for the stable development of China-Japan relationship.

The Middle East in 2017: Chaos without Order

by Li Yanan, Assistant Research Fellow from the Institute of Middle East Studies, CICIR. In 2017, the fragmentation of the geostrategic landscape was deepening in the Middle East, while the new order was not in sight. The Islamic State was accelerating the process of its demise, with problems in regional governance again becoming prominent; contention for borderland and vacuum became the focus, with conflicts presenting a long-term trend; contradictions within the existing coalitions got intensified with frequent signs of split crises; and the non-state actors became stronger, demanding sovereignty division. The power balance among regional powers changed without forming a new balance of power in the region. Iran was steadily reaping the rewards from its operations, consolidating the crescent belt and substituting offense with defense; Saudi Arabia’s sense of crisis was rising, while re-organizing the anti-Iran coalition without proper tactics; Turkey returned to the Middle East and tried to ensure its core security interests, while taking offense for defense. The game engaged in by major powers outside the region changed from “dominance by one major power” to “confrontation between two big powers”, which intensified the regionaldivision. The new US administration adjusted its policy toward the region, giving emphasis on containing Iran and counter-terrorism with the strategic focus on containing Iran; Russia’s influence in the region was rising and it stood up to the US in Syria, while making great efforts to engage in partnerships in a profound way; “temporary interest groups” imposed impacts on traditional alliance system with division and realignment of various forces speeding up.

War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula

by GeorgyToloraya, Professor from the Oriental Teaching and Researching Department of the MGIMO and Director of the Center for Asian Strategic Studies under the Institute of Economic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The situation on the Korean Peninsula had been worsening during the period from 2016 to 2017. Although this trend can be attributed to such subjective factors as personal confrontation between Trump and Kim Jong-un among others, the major cause lies in the fact that the Korean War was not ended to the satisfaction of the US and the ROK, namely destroying North Korea and taking up North Korea’s land to unify the peninsula. North Korea’s choice is to reach a strategic balance with the US by developing nuclear weapons and force its rival to end the war in form, recognize North Korea’s status, and provide security guarantee and development opportunities. Nonetheless, the US is afraid that North Korea would assume a “sense of impunity” after achieving its goals, further blackmail the allies of the US, and force the US to compromise. Currently, the possibility to resolve the North Korean issue by force cannot be excluded. The policies of Russia and China are decisive factors to the healthy development of the US-DPRK relations.