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Abstracts for Volume 5 of Peace and Development in 2017

Publish Date:2017-10-31 Source: [Large Small]

The Policy Adjustment of the Trump Administration toward the DPRK Nuclear Issue and Its Prospect

By Wang Min, Associate Professor and Graduate Supervisor from the School of Marxism, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, and Post-doctor at the Institute of International Relations, Nanjing University; Zhu Feng, Professor and Director of the Institute of International Relations, Nanjing University, Executive Director of Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies of Nanjing University and Guest Research Fellow of CPDS. With the DPRK nuclear issue fermenting and the situation in the Korean Peninsula intensifying in recent years, the policy of “strategic patience” taken by the Obama administration toward the DPRK nuclear issue has come to an end. After coming to power, the Trump administration made a major adjustment of the US policy toward the DPRK nuclear issue, which is more flexible and timely on the operational level. The Trump administration has set restraining the development of the DPRK nuclear and missile capability as the most urgent and major task on its diplomatic agenda, pursuing a “coercive engagement” policy toward the DPRK. The US has tried to force the DPRK to engage with the US proactively by strengthening its own “power” as well as by putting extreme pressure and upgrading secondary sanctions on the DPRK so as to possibly avoid the outbreak of military conflict. In order to reach the goal of bringing the DPRK back again to the diplomatic negotiation table, the new US policy toward the DPRK nuclear issue has increased the momentum of coordinating with China. From the present situation, the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue calls for new thinking and method, as the establishment of peace mechanism and the realization of the Korean Peninsula denuclearization do not go against one another.

 

Countermeasures of the Abe's Administration toward the DPRK Nuclear and Missile Issue

By Xu Wansheng, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor from PLA University of Foreign Language and Guest Research Fellow of CPDS; and Jiang Mingchen, Graduate Student from PLA University of Foreign Language. Under the circumstance that the Korean Peninsula situation is deteriorating, the Abe's Administration of Japan has proposed such policies as enhancing the buildup of defense power, associating with the international community, giving a bigger role to China, putting more pressures on the DPRK and prioritizing hostage taking, as well as taken such practical measures as forming the response mechanism, formulating programmatic documents, upgrading armament, strengthening alliance deterrence, expanding international cooperation, laying tough sanctions on the DPRK, hyping up the severe situation to cope with the DPRK nuclear and missile issue. This has revealed the in-depth strategic intention of the Abe's Administration to maximize Japan’s national interests, wishing to boost the “military normalization” of Japan, concentrate Japan’s alliance building power, raising Japan’s discourse power in international affairs and strengthening Japan’s jetton in gaming with China, which has exerted  serious and negative impacts on the Korean Peninsula situation.

 

Submission or Balancing: the Foreign Strategic Tradition of the ROK and Its Current Effects

By Ge Hanwen, Deputy Director and Associate Professor from the Center for International Security Studies under the International Studies College, the National University of Defense Technology; and Lin Jiaxuan, Graduate Student from the International Relations College, the National University of Defense Technology. Geopolitics together with the evolution of history has shaped the traditions of the ROK’s national security strategy. Its submission strategy tradition recognized that there has been a great disparity in power between the regimes in the peninsula and the neighboring powers, insisting on submission and cooperation with the most powerful neighbor in the region, in exchange for the tolerance of the big power for its maintenance of independence and autonomy; while the balancing strategy is intended to utilize, initiate or even proactively incite the potential or existing contradictions among the neighboring powers, in a hope that the neighboring powers would reach a balance of power and mutual constraint among them so that it could make big gains with small losses as well as maintain its autonomy and growth in power. During the Cold War, the ROK’s national security policy was an extension of its submission strategy. After the Cold War, its national security strategy once showed signs of shifting toward the balancing strategy. With the changes of the international situation, the submission strategy is taking an upper hand once again in current ROK’s considerations of its external strategy.

 

The New Trend of Major Powers’ Indo-Pacific Strategic Interaction from the Perspective of the “Malabar” Exercise

By Rong Ying, Vice President and Research Fellow of China Institute of International Studies and Guest Research Fellow of CPDS. In July of 2017, India, the US and Japan conducted the 21st “Malabar” joint naval exercise at the Bay of Bengal. The “Malabar” joint exercise has grown from small to large and from bilateral to multilateral, reflecting the change of geostrategic pattern in the Indo-Pacific region and the new trend of major powers’ competition and interaction. India, the US and Japan colluded with one another in a “small circle”, which has intensified the geostrategic contention among major powers, not only inflicting significant impact on the Indo-Pacific geostrategic pattern for the next 10 to 20 years, but also bringing up complicated factors to China’s advance with its maritime power strategy. China should actively argue for its common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security mindset, promote the Indo-Pacific maritime security cooperation, shape the new regional maritime security order and go with great efforts on the path of building itself into a maritime power with Chinese characteristics.

 

Confrontation at Dong Lang and Development Trend of China-India Relationship

By Ma Jiali, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, China Reform Forum and Guest Research Fellow of CPDS. From June to August of 2017, the China-India relationship witnessed a crisis seldom seen in the past. Indian troops intruded Chinese territory at the Sikkim section of the Sino-Indian border, obstructing unjustifiably the road building of Chinese border troops at Dong Lang, which brought about a serious confrontation between the two sides. This incident took place as the Indian side seriously misjudged the Chinese intentions, resulting in a serious retrogression of the bilateral relationship. Currently, the border disputes between China and India have not been resolved once and for all, the so called "exile government" of Dalai group is still engaging in separatist activities in India, certain negative geostrategic factors in South Asia or Asia are intensifying rather than being removed, and potential contradictions brought about by the change of international relationship pattern are becoming increasingly outstanding. Against such a background, how to manage and control the frictions at the border to, eliminate the hidden conflicts and avoid possible strategic collision in the future have put the strategic focus and wisdom of the two countries to a serious test.

 

The Belt and Road Initiative Leads the Re-Balancing Process of Globalization

By Zhu Caihua, Deputy Director and Professor from the Institute of Foreign Trade of the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, MOFCOM; and Guest Research Fellow of CPDS. The financial crisis taking place in 2008 has made every country of the world aware that they could no longer neglect the serious issue of global imbalance brought about by the new liberalistic globalization. Nevertheless, in the later process in which every country of the world was busy coping with the financial and debt crises, they seemed unable to find the right path to address the global imbalance, but spearheaded at the globalization instead, coupling with escalating global trade and investment protectionism, with the foreign policy measures issued intensively by the US new president Trump putting the globalization in the danger of falling back. Against such a background, the Belt and Road initiative proposed by China on the basis of such principles as mutual consultation, joint construction and sharing together is being accepted and joined in by more and more countries in the world after four years’ practice. So to speak, the Belt and Road initiative is providing a new globalization model under a “common governance pattern” for rebalancing the imbalanced globalization, which will play a critical and irreplaceable role in rebalancing the operation of the world economy, the international pattern of interests and the pattern of global governance.

 

How to Construct RCEP: China’s Perspective

By Quan Yi, Research Fellow from the Fujian Academy of Social Sciences; ShenMinghui, Research Fellow from National Institute of International Strategy, CASS; and QiuLina, Graduate Student from the Graduate School of CASS. The RCEP is the most important initiative for regional integration in East Asia, which is of great significance for streamlining the existing complex economic cooperation systems in East Asia, eliminating the “Spaghetti Bowl” effect, harmonizing the regional production networks, and raising the level of liberalization. From China’s perspective, the RCEP has provided an opportunity for China’s in-depth participation in formulating the rules for regional integration and leading the future direction for economic cooperation, which calls for China’s close attention and continued support for the on-going negotiations. Nonetheless, the RCEP is also faced with hard nuts to crack, such as wild disputes over the liberalization level and division between different negotiating camps. With regard to the dilemma that although the RCEP has engaged in many processes, few results have been made, China should actively advance and selectively raise its opening commitment to the RCEP, lead the negotiation process, upgrade the existing level of FTA, while boosting the negotiation of the RCEP together with the Belt and Road initiative, promoting reforms of internal regulations, and remaining better prepared for risks.

 

Prospect of Promoting Japan to Join the Building of  East Asian Community of Common Destiny under the Backgroung of  the Belt and Road Initiative

By Guo Limeng, postgraduate student of Humanities and Social Science School, National University of Defense Technology, and Zhu Qichao, Director and Professor of the Center for National Security and Strategic Studies, National University of Defense Technology. Since the emergence of the trend of regional integration in East Asia, there has been an unwavering pursuit of establishing East Asian Community among relevant states. The Japanese government had been enthusiastically about the construction of East Asian Community, and two sessions of cabinets had proposed conceptions of East Asian Community guided by different ideas. Faced with the facts that states are closely connected by regional cooperation, China also puts forward the framework of Community of Common Destiny. In recent years, Japan has demonstrated a tendency to go against the East Asia Community, breaking peace and stability of the region, and the reasons are manifold. The influence of the United States cannot be ignored on the construction of the East Asian community. The construction of new power relations and the Belt and Road is conducive to the promotion of East Asian community. China has always been committed to regional cooperation, peace and stability, which are in the national interest of China. China should make full efforts to develop the conception of East Asian Community according to its own interests.

 
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